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INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNI
TIES Acr: Do TIERED CORPORATE SUBSIDIARIES CONSTITUTE
FOREIGN STATES?

INTRODUcrION

In today's global economy, United States citizens increasingly
come into contact with foreign corporations.! When a legal injury
arises out of that contact, a United States plaintiff often finds to his
or her surprise that the offending corporation qualifies for sover
eign immunity under U.S. laws because of ownership, albeit partial
and indirect, by a foreign government. The Foreign Sovereign Im
munities Act ("FSIA"),2 the sole basis of jurisdiction in federal and
state courts for suits involving foreign governments,3 extends immu
nity protection not only to foreign states, but also to foreign corpo
rations that are majority-owned by foreign states. 4
The situation often arises that a corporation is not directly ma
jority-owned by a foreign state, but through a parent/subsidiary
structure is majority-owned by another corporation which is di
rectly majority-owned by a foreign state. This hierarchical system
of ownership is known as "tiering." Courts struggle with the issue
of whether a particular entity in a "tiered" corporate structure ful
fills the requirements of the FSIA's definition of a foreign state,
thus enjoying the many protections afforded by the FSIA.5 A split
between two federal courts of appeals recently developed over the
1. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO
CORPORATION LAW (1993). The book examines the new multinational corporations
that dominate our world economy today. The author points out ways that United
States corporate law, developed when corporations were single entities, with one owner
and one purpose, must change to accommodate this new corporate structure. See id. at
231-53.
2. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994).
3. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 433
(1989).
4. See 28 U.S.c. § 1603(a)-(b) (1994). Section 1603(a) extends immunity protec
tion to an entity which is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Section
1603(b) defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as an entity having a
majority of shares or other ownership interests owned by a foreign state. See infra Part
I.C.3 for the text of these sections.
5. See infra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the benefits provided by the FSIA.
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interpretation of the FSIA's requirement of majority ownership by
a foreign state, as outlined in 28 U.S.c. § 1603(b).
This Note addresses the FSIA's requirement of majority own
ership by a foreign state, under section 1603(b). It examines
whether the FSIA requires that a foreign corporation have actual
direct ownership by a foreign state, or whether by "tiering" owner
ship interests, a foreign corporation may claim protection because a
parent company has majority ownership by a foreign state. Part I
of this Note discusses the history of sovereign immunity as it devel
oped in the United States and the congressional purpose in enacting
the FSIA. This Part also reviews the statutory scheme in sections
1603(a) and (b) of the FSIA, and describes how the FSIA functions
in theory and in practice. Part II describes the judicial treatment of
tiering for the FSIA's first twenty years and presents the current
division of opinion in the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth6 and Seventh7 Circuits. It also examines an alternative view
point on this issue found in a case from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 8 Part III examines
the applicable sections of the FSIA using the traditional statutory
interpretation methods employed by the Ninth and the Seventh
Circuits, and concludes that traditional statutory interpretation of
fers no solution to the tiering issue. This Note suggests that a better
analysis of this issue focuses not on examining whether Congress
intended to include foreign corporations under the FSIA because
they are majority owned by other agencies, but on examining what
Congress meant by majority ownership by a foreign state. Part III
suggests that in enacting the FSIA, Congress meant to protect only
those corporations that are directly owned by a foreign state.
Therefore, the FSIA, intended to provide a fair and predictable
procedure allowing a United States plaintiff to sue a foreign corpo
ration, did not intend to base immunity on a tiered corporate
relationship.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States
1. Absolute Sovereign Immunity
Historically, foreign states sued in United States courts en

6. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
7. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932
(7th Cir. 1996).
8. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

1998]

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

389

countered uncertain and unpredictable treatment. 9 Until the mid
1900's, foreign states enjoyed and expected absolute sovereign im
munity.lO Under the concept of absolute sovereign immunity, a
sovereign state is not, without its consent, subject to suit in its own
or in foreign courts.ll Absolute sovereign immunity became the
law of the land in 1812 with the Supreme Court's seminal decision
in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.1 2 This decision became con
trolling authority for foreign sovereign immunity issues for the next
140 years.13
At the time the Court decided Schooner Exchange, it consid
ered whether absolute sovereign immunity was the appropriate so
lution for every suit involving a foreign state. While holding that
sovereign immunity absolutely protected a French naval ship in
Schooner Exchange, the Court hinted that absolute immunity might
9. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. 6604,
6605-06; see also Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Right to a Jury
Trial in Suits Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L.
159, 162-65 (1996) (examining the evolution of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immu
nity in the United States); William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 257-61 (1997) (present
ing a thorough explanation of the history of sovereign immunity).
10. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); see also
Dorsey, supra note 9, at 257-58; Abir, supra note 9, at 162-63.
11. The doctrine of sovereign immunity historically stems from the concept that
"the King can do no wrong." More modem reasons for extending sovereign immunity
are comity and the importance of following the customs of international law. See Ver
linden, 461 U.S. at 486 (explaining that absolute sovereign immunity is "a matter of
grace and comity"); see also H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.AN. at 6606 (noting that absolute sovereign immunity was recognized in the
United States as a doctrine of international law). Overall, the traditional rationale for
absolute immunity was to avoid adjudication which might offend a foreign nation and
embarrass the executive branch in its dealings with foreign nations. See Foreign Sover
eign Immunities Act, Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Congo 30 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Hearings]; see also Dorsey, supra note 9, at 257 (stating that the pur
pose of sovereign immunity "is to avoid friction in international relations").
12. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In Schooner Exchange, a ship in Napoleon's
navy was arrested in the Port of Philadelphia by two U.S. citizens who claimed it was
rightfully theirs. Chief Justice Marshall granted the executive branch's request for im
munity, stating that the Court had no jurisdiction over the government of a foreign
state. See id. at 147. This case is consistently cited as the classic statement of the rule of
absolute sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; Berizzi Bros. CO. V.
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
13. It was not until 1952 that the State Department officially changed the foreign
immunity policy of the United States to one of "restrictive immunity." See Letter from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisory of the Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 [hereinafter Tate
Letter]. For an explanation of "restrictive immunity," see infra Part I.A3.
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not apply where a sovereign entered and participated in the mar
ketplace. 14 Thus, even at this early date, while adopting the abso
lute sovereign immunity doctrine, the Court raised an issue still
being deliberated today: whether sovereign immunity protection
should be afforded to corporations owned by a foreign state. 15
2.

The "Separate Entity" Rule 16

In Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank,17 Chief Justice
Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion in Schooner Exchange,
again spoke on the principles of sovereign immunity. He pointed
out that a state-owned corporation is not necessarily a foreign sov
ereign. 18 In Planters' Bank, because the state of Georgia (techni
cally a foreign state) incorporated its bank, thereby conferring both
a separate legal identity and the capacity to sue and be sued,19 the
Court held that it "voluntarily strip[ped] itself of its sovereign char
acter, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank, and waive[d]
all the privileges of that character."2o The Court therefore con
cluded that the bank could be sued in a United States court. 21
14. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 123. The district attorney, ar
guing for the government, stated that "if a sovereign descend from the throne and be
come a merchant, he submits to the laws of the country. If he contract private debts, his
private funds are liable. So if he charter a vessel, the cargo is liable for the freight." Id.
Chief Justice Marshall seemed to agree when he stated that "there is a manifest distinc
tion between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and that
military force which supports the sovereign power ...." Id. at 145. However, 100 years
later in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, the Court extended absolute sovereign immu
nity to commercial ships that were owned by a foreign state. See Berizzi, 271 U.S. at
574.
15. See generally Abir, supra note 9, at 179-82 (addressing the unfair advantage
that immunity gives foreign corporations over domestic corporations); William C. Hoff
man, The Separate Entity Rule in International Perspective: Should State Ownership of
Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 TuL. L. REv.
535,571-77 (1991) (addressing the unfair advantage that immunity gives foreign corpo
rations over United States' plaintiffs).
16. For a thorough discussion of the "separate entity" rule in theory, and as it has
developed in the United States, see Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542-51.
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
18. See id. at 907. "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the trans
action of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen."
Id.
19. The Court based its ruling not on the commercial activity of the state owned
corporation, but on the fact that the corporation had a legal personality separate from
the state. Therefore, the suit was not against "the King" and the rationale for sovereign
immunity did not apply. See id. at 907-08.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 908.
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Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning provided the basis for the "sepa
rate entity" rule, a doctrine that developed in the United States sep
arate from, but related to, the absolute immunity rule. 22
The "separate entity" rule provided that where a foreign-state
owned 'corporate entity has its own legal personality, distinct from
its governmental shareholders, the underlying rationale for absolute
immunity, "the King can do no wrong," ceased to exist. The foreign
corporation may therefore be sued as any private corporation. 23
This rule in theory limited the absolute sovereign immunity doc
trine, because courts could apply it to deny absolute immunity to
defendant foreign corporations owned by a foreign state. In prac
tice, however, due to confusion over the rule, courts applied the
"separate entity" rule haphazardly, with most courts continuing to
recognize an absolute theory of sovereign immunity in suits involv
ing foreign-government-owned corporations.24 Thus, U.S. citizens
involved in commercial disputes with or injured by the tortious acts
22. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542-43 (explaining that because a suit against
a state-owned corporation with a separate legal personality is not against the state itself,
sovereign immunity does not attach at all unless the court finds that evidence of corpo
rate separateness is insufficient).
23. See Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 907-08. The "separate entity" rule is
still applied today by most Western countries. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542, 554
(explaining that while for most of the twentieth century Western nations used the "sep
arate entity" rule in applying absolute sovereign immunity theory, the "separate entity"
rule is still used today by all European countries and Great Britain in applying a more
limited "restrictive" immunity).
24. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542-43. Hoffman describes how the "separate
entity" rule was continually misused by courts when determining absolute immunity
and later, under a more restrictive theory of immunity. See id. at 541-51. Because the
Supreme Court never ruled on the application of the "separate entity" rule to sovereign
immunity, lower courts were left without guidelines on how to determine whether a
separate legal personality existed. Some courts turned to common law principals and
agency concepts traditionally used in disregarding the corporate form, to determine the
amount of control a foreign state exercised over the corporation, and thus whether a
separate legal personality existed. See id. at 548. Courts looking to common law princi
ples and agency concepts were split, however, on the proper test for control. See id. at
548 n.71. Other courts looked to the presence of a consent clause in the corporate
charter, treating consent to be sued as a waiver of immunity. See id. at 549 n.75. After
the Tate Letter, see supra note 13, in 1952, when the rule of immunity changed to the
"restrictive" theory, courts ignored the "separate entity" rule altogether. See Hoffman,
supra note 15, at 548. See infra Part I.A.5 for an explanation of the Tate Letter. For an
explanation of "restrictive" sovereign immunity and how courts applied it, see infra
Part LA.3. To further the confusion, some courts then looked to the State Department
for a determination of immunity based solely on political factors. See Hoffman, supra
note 15, at 549; see also Sandra Engle, Note, Choosing Law for Attributing Liability
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Proposal for Uniformity, 15 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1060,1064 & n.23 (1993) (describing lack of uniformity of the courts' treat
ment of sovereign immunity).
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of these corporations were left with no legal redress. 25
3.

Restrictive Immunity

Over time, as sovereigns increasingly entered the marketplace
and engaged in commercial activities, the rule in the United States
gradually evolved from absolute sovereign immunity to restrictive
immunity.26 Under the doctrine of restrictive immunity, foreign
governments acting within their governmental or public powers
continued to receive absolute immunity from suit in United States
courts. When acting as a private party in a commercial setting,
however, foreign governments lost their immunity protection and
became subject to suit.27
Theoretically, a court examining whether to accord sovereign
immunity first determined whether the entity being sued qualified
as a foreign state, according to the "separate entity" rule. At this
stage of the analysis, the court presumed that a foreign corporation
was a distinct "separate entity" unless the foreign corporation
proved otherwise. 28 In theory, most foreign corporations would not
be granted foreign sovereign status, and would therefore not re
ceive any immunity at all, absolute or restrictive, because they sim
ply were not considered foreign states. 29
25. See Engle, supra note 24, at 1064.
26. As the Supreme Court suggested in dicta in Schooner Exchange, when a sov
ereign enters into the marketplace and acts as a private party, the justification for abso
lute sovereign immunity fails to exist. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
145. The difference between absolute immunity and restrictive immunity is fundamen
tal. Absolute immunity is based on the character of a sovereign, and attaches in all
cases because a sovereign may not be sued. Restrictive immunity, however, is based on
the act which is the basis of the suit against the sovereign, and attaches only when the
act is governmental in nature. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542 n.40. For an early
example of the application of restrictive immunity, see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30
(1945), where the Court denied immunity to a ship owned by the government of Mexico
because it was being operated by a private commercial corporation. See id. at 38.
27. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (stating
that under the restrictive theory, immunity is limited to cases arising from a foreign
sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to suits involving a foreign sovereign's
commercial acts); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605; Abir, supra note 9, at 164-65; Dorsey, supra note 9, at 258.
28. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 545-47 (stating that by the 1920's, foreign
government-owned corporations in banking, shipping, railroads, agriculture, and min
ing were granted or denied immunity according to the "separate entity" rule, based on
evidence of their corporate separateness from their governmental owners).
29. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 543 (explaining that the separate entity rule
"supplies a presumption that incorporated entities do not enjoy immunity"). For exam
ples of cases where courts followed the "separate entity" rule before applying the re
strictive principle of immunity, see Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse des Charbons,
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Only if a defendant foreign corporation overcame the pre
sumption of corporate independence and the court deemed it to be
an "agency" of the foreign state, would the court analyze the nature
of the activity in question. 30 The court's analysis turned on whether
the corporation acted in a public (governmental) or private (com
mercial) capacity.31 If the court found that the corporation acted in
a public capacity, the corporation was immune from suit. 32 Con
versely, if the court deemed the act private or commercial, as would
be the case with many foreign-government-owned corporations, no
immunity applied. 33 The court ruling compelled the foreign corpo
ration to defend itself in court and subject itself to the same legal
risks encountered by any other nongovernmental entity.34

Basle, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that a Swiss-government-owned corpora
tion for the importation and distribution of coal could be sued for breach of contract)
and United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschajt, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)
(holding that a French-government-owned mining corporation could be sued because a
corporation was not a government, even though it was majority-owned by a
government).
30. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of
Foreign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3D 322, 340-42 (1970)
(providing an explanation of how different courts determined instrumentality status
before the FSIA).
31. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 548-49. The courts at this time were also split
on the proper public/private test to use in determining restrictive immunity. See id.
Some courts looked objectively to the nature of the act itself, while other courts looked
subjectively to the purpose of the act. See id. at 549 n.74.This conflict was resolved
with the passage of the FSIA, as Congress clearly set the proper test as an objective
one, examining the nature of the act, not the actor's purpose. See Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1993). "[T]he commercial character of an act [in ques
tion] is to be determined by reference to its 'nature' rather than its 'purpose,' [there
fore] the question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive
or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives." Id. at 360 (quoting
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
32. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 359-60. Explaining the difference between private and
public acts for purposes of restrictive immunity, the Court stated that a state engages in
public activity when it exercises "powers peculiar to sovereigns," such as police power.
Id. at 360. Furthermore, when a foreign state exercises these powers, even in a tortious
manner, as in systematic police torture of an American citizen, the foreign state must be
granted immunity from suit. See id. at 361.
33. See Argentina, 504 U.S. at 614. The Court explained that under the restrictive
theory of immunity, a commercial activity is one where the state "exercises only those
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens," such as engaging in "trade and
traffic or commerce." Id. When the state so acts, it is liable to suit as would be any
private citizen. See id.
34. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 564-65 (describing how European countries
today universally apply the separate entity rule before deciding if restrictive immunity
applies, and arguing that this is the most practical method to treat state owned entities).
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The Immunity Determination in Practice

In actual practice, however, courts looked less to the public or
private nature of the foreign government's acts, and more to the
policies of the State Department in determining issues of immu
nity.35 In 1943, in Ex Parte Republic of Peru,36 the Supreme Court
held that given the nature of foreign immunity and separation of
powers principles, United States courts must automatically defer to
the executive branch when called upon to decide the issue of immu
nity.37 The State Department, in turn, invariably adhered to the
absolute rule of sovereign immunity.38 The fate of a U.S. plaintiff
with a complaint against a foreign-government-owned corporation
depended not on the evidence of corporate separation from the for
eign state, as per the "separate entity" rule, or on the nature of the
act being sued on, as per the theory of restrictive immunity, but
solely on the political status of the government that held ownership
in the defendant corporation. 39 Therefore, rather than seeing an
erosion of absolute immunity, actual practice demonstrated adher
ence to this outdated doctrine for political, rather than legal,
reasons.

5.

The "Tate Letter"

In 1952, the State Department, realizing that the United States
treatment of foreign sovereigns was inconsistent with international
law,40 announced a modification of its previous immunity policy by
issuing a letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Depart
ment of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip Perlman. 41 The
35. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,34-35 (1945) (stating the long accepted
rule that federal courts must defer to the State Department's wishes concerning immu
nity of a foreign state, under the prinCiple that "the courts should not so act as to em
barrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs"); Ex Parte Republic of Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (stating that claims against friendly nations are normally set
tled under the foreign affairs powers of the President and the State Department); see
also H.R. REP No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6606.
36. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
37. See id. at 588; see also Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 32-33.
38. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (stating
that when reviewing immunity decisions, the Court has consistently deferred to the
State Department that, until 1952, "ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against
friendly foreign sovereigns").
39. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
40. See Dorsey, supra note 9, at 258-59 (explaining that the restrictive theory of
immunity was the internationally accepted standard).
41. See Tate Letter, supra note 13, at 984-85 (listing countries that follow restric
tive immunity and noting that little support was found for absolute immunity). The
change in State Department policy can be directly attributed to the fact that the abso
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"Tate Letter" formally adopted restrictive immunity principles,
stating that in the future, immunity should be granted in cases
based on a foreign state's public acts, but not in cases based on
commercial or private acts.42 Under the Tate Letter principles, a
defending foreign state could raise sovereign immunity as an af
firmative defense before the court, or could petition the State De
partment for a ruling, binding on the court, that the acts in question
were public and therefore immune. 43
B.

Substantial Need for a Uniform Rule
1.

United States Policy Was Unpredictable

Rather than having the desired effect of greater certainty in
immunity cases, the Tate Letter generated more unpredictable re
sults in United States courts.44 When a foreign state petitioned the
State Department for immunity, as was traditionally done, restric
tive immunity supposedly applied, and the State Department then
notified the court of its ruling. 45 However, although the Tate Letter
set restrictive immunity as the official rule, courts granted absolute
immunity in many cases, depending on diplomatic relations with the
foreign state. 46
lute immunity extended to foreign sovereigns in United States courts was inconsistent
with the restrictive immunity extended to the United States government by foreign
courts. See id. at 985; see also 1976 Hearings, supra note 11, at 26 ("The Tate letter was
based on a realization that the prior absolute rule of sovereign immunity was no longer
consistent with modem international law."); H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 9, reprinted in
1976 U.S.CCAN. at 6607 (stating that in the mid-1950's, the United States, increas
ingly involved in foreign suits, was continually denied immunity by foreign courts apply
ing restrictive immunity).
42. See Tate Letter, supra note 13, at 985; see also H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 8,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 6607; Dorsey, supra note 9, at 259.
43. See Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34
STAN. L. REv. 385, 385 n.3 (1982).
44. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983) (re
viewing the confusing state of United States foreign immunity policy after the "Tate
Letter," but before the enactment of the FSIA).
45. The decision of whether to petition the State Department for immunity, or
litigate the defense entirely in court, was left to the foreign state. See H.R. REp. No. 94
1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCAN. at 6607; see also 1976 Hearings,.supra note
11, at 26 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State) (recogniz
ing that a foreign state defendant usually chose to make a formal diplomatic request to
have the State Department recognize its immunity). If the State Department allowed
that immunity, the Justice Department would send the court a "suggestion of immu
nity." See Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts
1976-1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 20 (1986).
46. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 ("[P]olitical considerations led to suggestions of
immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive
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If a foreign state did not petition the executive branch, leaving
the court to decide whether the particular entity's acts were pro
tected by immunity, the court faced confusion on what test to ap
ply.47 Some courts first applied the "separate entity" rule to
determine whether the entity in question was a foreign state, while
others merely applied the restrictive immunity rule. 48 In applying
the restrictive immunity rule, courts confronted additional confu
sion in determining whether a foreign state conducted a public or
private activity.49 Still other courts decided the immunity issue
solely on consent, looking only to see whether the corporate charter
contained an immunity waiver. 50 Thus, a U.S. plaintiff, faced with a
suit against a foreign-government-owned corporation, could never
predict where, how, or even if his claim would be heard. 51

2.

United States Policy Contrasted with
International Practice

While other countries in the Western world were almost uni
formly adopting the restrictive sovereign immunity rule, American
law on the issue of immunity continued in a chaotic and unpredict
able state. 52 Moreover, in direct contrast to the United States,
other countries decided the immunity issue through court analysis,
theory."); H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 8-9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607 (ac
knowledging that although the State Department's official policy was the rule of restric
tive immunity, the State Department often bowed to diplomatic pressure asserted by
the foreign state); see also Dorsey, supra note 9, at 259 (stating diplomatic pressure
could sometimes influence the State Department's decision); Feldman, supra note 45, at
20 (stating decisions of the State Department were often influenced by diplomatic con
siderations); Engle, supra note 24, at 1065-67 (suggesting that although restrictive im
munity was the official policy of the State Department, political considerations still
influenced its decisions).
47. See Abir, supra note 9, at 165. "Today, even after the passage of the FSIA,
courts are still trying to determine the difference between a commercial and private
activity of a foreign state." Id.
48. See supra Part 1.A.2-3 for an explanation of the "separate entity" rule and its
relation to the restrictive theory of immunity.
49. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
50. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 549 & n.75; see also Note, Sovereign Immunity
of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1086 (1965) (presenting
a contemporaneous analysis of the confusion caused by inconsistent application of the
restrictive immunity rule).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607; Dor
sey, supra note 9, at 259-60. To make matters worse, even in cases where a successful
plaintiff received a judgment against a foreign state, there was no legal procedure al
lowing that plaintiff to actually execute the judgment. See Abir, supra note 9, at 165;
Kane, supra note 43, at 407 n.116.
52. See Dorsey, supra note 9, at 258-59; Hoffman, supra note 15, at 536 n.5; Rob
ert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANS.
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rather than through diplomatic channels. 53 The United States, es
pecially after World War II with its increased military presence in
Western Europe, more often found itself involved in litigation in
foreign courts. 54 Invariably, the Department of Justice instructed
foreign counsel to plead sovereign immunity. Just as invariably,
however, Western European countries denied their pleas, following
closely the restrictive immunity rule. 55 U.S. corporations abroad
were compelled to defend themselves in foreign courts at the same
time that foreign-government-owned corporations doing business in
the United States enjoyed immunity from lawsuits, granted either
by the State Department or by the courts. The sharp increase in
foreign-government-owned corporations entering the United
States' marketplace only served to heighten the confusion and high
light the unfairness forced upon U.S. plaintiffs. 56 A sense of ur
gency developed, prompting Congress to act to correct the
inequitable treatment encountered by U.S. citizens. 57
C.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
1.

Purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976

Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
following many years of combined input from Congress, the
Department of State, the courts, and the legal and academic com-
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L. 33, 38 (1978) (stating that all countries in Western Europe, with the sole
exception of the United Kingdom, applied restrictive immunity).
53. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6608; see
also 1976 Hearings, supra note 11, at 26-27 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser,
Department of State) (stating that allowing foreign states to petition the State Depart
ment for consideration of immunity left the United States at a distinct disadvantage,
when it could not do the same in other countries, where sovereign immunity was de
cided exclusively by the courts).
54. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6607.
55. See id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6607.
56. See id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6607.
57. See id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6608; Abir, supra note 9, at 165
(explaining that the chaotic situation over which rule to apply and the difficulties of
enforcing a judgment against a foreign state "led the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government to cooperate in an effort to resolve substantive and proce
dural confusion surrounding foreign sovereign immunity"); von Mehren, supra note 52,
at 33 n.1 (stating that pressure on Congress to act began in 1961, after an unpopular
decision in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, s.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (holding that a
grant of sovereign immunity issued by the State Department should be accepted with
out question by the court even when Cuba had specifically waived immunity».
58. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994».
NAT'L
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munities. 59 Congress declared that the FSIA "serve[d] the interests
of justice" and "protect[ed] the interests of both foreign states and
litigants" by ensuring that all immunity decisions would be made by
the courts under the principles set forth in the FSIA.60 More specif
ically, Congress stated that the FSIA's purpose was "to provide a
procedure whereby a United States plaintiff could maintain a law
suit against a foreign state or its entities and to provide a compre
hensive substantive framework to determine when a foreign state is
entitled to sovereign immunity."61 Substantively, Congress in
tended the FSIA to codify the internationally accepted doctrine of
restrictive immunity62 and to remove the decision making process
from the State Department and place it with the judiciary,63 thereby
bringing the United States into line with international practice. 64
Procedurally, Congress intended the FSIA to provide a statutory
framework for both obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign
state and executing a judgment on a foreign state. 65 Overall, Con
gress intended the FSIA to ensure evenhandedness to United
59. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6608. The
FSIA, first introduced as H.R. 3493, 93rd Congo (1973), was the subject of much debate
and several amendments before finally winning the approval of the American Bar As
sociation and the Maritime Bar Association in August of 1976. See H.R. REp. No. 94
1487, at 9-10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6608. For a comprehensive explanation
of the legislative process leading to the enactment of the FSIA, see Mark B. Feldman,
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's
View, 35 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 302, 304 (1986).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994).
61. H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604. The
general purpose of the FSIA was to "assure that American citizens [were] not deprived
of normal legal redress against foreign states who engage in ordinary commercial trans
actions ...." 1976 Hearings, supra note 11, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State).
62. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605.
American citizens had recently begun coming into contact with foreign state entities
and it had become "clear that our judicial system requires comprehensive standards on
when and how a citizen can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities and
when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. "The specific applications
of [the restrictive] principle of international law are codified in [the FSIA]." 1976 Hear
ings, supra note 11, at 25 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of
State).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606. "In
virtually every other country in the world, sovereign immunity is a question of interna
tionallaw decided exclusively by the courts and not by institutions concerned with for
eign affairs." 1976 Hearings, supra note 11, at 27 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606; see
also Hoffman, supra note 15, at 536.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606. Up
until the passage of the FSIA, even in those cases where foreign corporations were
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States plaintiffs, who were increasingly interacting with foreign
states and corporations owned by foreign states. 66 When signing
the FSIA into law, President Gerald Ford stated:
This statute will also make it easier for our citizens and foreign
governments to tum to the courts to resolve ordinary legal dis
putes. In this respect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act car
ries forward a modem and enlightened trend in international law.
And it makes this development in the law available to all Ameri
can citizens. 67

2.

How the FSIA Is Intended to Work

Congress intended the FSIA to be the sole basis upon which
courts decide all issues of foreign immunity, preempting all state
and federal law, except international treaties. 68 Under the FSIA,
foreign states,69 their political subdivisions,70 as well as their agen
cies or instrumentalities,71 are immune from suit in the United
States unless the act that forms the basis of the suit falls within one
of the FSIA's exceptions, the major exception being for commercial
acts.72
For example, if a United States citizen73 wants to bring an ac
subject to suit, American law provided no procedural means for an execution of judg
ment. See Dorsey, supra note 9, at 260.
66. See 28 U.S.c. § 1602 (1994); H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605; Hoffman, supra note 15, at 536.
67. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, GERALD R. FORD, 1976-77, BOOK III
2610 (1979).
68. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443
(1989); see also H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610;
Hoffman, supra note 15, at 261.
69. The State Department still decides the question of which governments are
recognized as foreign states.
70. Congress intended "political subdivisions" to mean all governmental units be
neath the central government. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613.
71. Congress required three criteria for an entity to be termed an "agency or
instrumentality" within the FSIA: (1) that it be a separate legal person, i.e., have its
own corporate identity; (2) that it be either an organ of a foreign state or a foreign
state's political subdivision, or have a majority of ownership interests owned by a for
eign state or foreign state's political subdivision; and (3) that it not be a citizen of the
United States. See id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
72. See 28 U.S.c. § 1605 (1994). In addition to the commercial activity exception,
a foreign state is not immune from suit when it has waived its immunity, when the
plaintiff alleges injury in violation of international law, when the plaintiff seeks money
damages for personal injury or death, or when the plaintiff sues to enforce a maritime
lien. See id.
73. Although the FSIA was clearly intended to provide American citizens with a
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tion against a foreign corporation for breach of contract, the foreign
corporation may assert sovereign immunity as an affirmative de
fense, claiming that it constitutes a foreign state as defined in the
FSIA,74 If the foreign corporation provides prima facie evidence
that it qualifies as a foreign state under the FSIA, because it is an
agency or instrumentality of the state, the burden shifts to the plain
tiff to show that the acts being sued on fall within one of the excep
tions to immunity set forth in the statute, for example, the
commercial activities exception,75 If the plaintiff fails to sustain this
burden, the foreign entity receives absolute immunity,76
If the plaintiff successfully meets the burden of proof that the
defendant's acts fall within a statutory exception, the defendant for
eign entity then may prove that the exception does not apply,77 If
the foreign defendant is successful, the court must grant absolute
immunity. If the court finds that the commercial exception applies,
as is usually the case with foreign-government-owned corporations,
the defendant corporation must defend itself in courUs Even when
the defendant corporation is not granted immunity, however, cer
tain benefits automatically adhere to the foreign entity because of
its qualification as a foreign state under the FSIA.79
3.

Benefits Accorded a Foreign State Under the FSIA

The FSIA grants many procedural benefits to any entity, com
mercial or not, that qualifies as a foreign state. SO First, the foreign
procedure to sue foreign states, the statute does not require that the plaintiff be an
American citizen. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983).
74. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that must be specifically
pleaded. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 V.S.CCAN. at 6616. For
a complete discussion of the procedural aspects of raising and proving sovereign immu
nity within the FSIA, see Kane, supra note 43, at 414-21.
75. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 V.S.CCAN. at 6616;
Kane, supra note 43, at 421. In the case of a foreign corporation, by far the most used
exception is the commercial activities exception.
76. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 V.S.CCAN. at 6616;
Kane, supra note 43, at 421.
77. The FSIA thus codifies restrictive immunity by granting foreign states, their
political subdivisions, and their agencies and instrumentalities a presumption of govern
mental purpose, which is then taken away if the court finds a commercial activity. For
eign-government-owned corporations routinely fail to escape the commercial activities
exception. See Rebecca J. Simmons, Nationalized and Denationalized Commercial En
terprises Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2278, 2280,
2288 (1990).
78. See id. at 2282-88 (providing an explanation of how courts have interpreted
the commercial activities exception).
79. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 571.
80. See id. (discussing the procedural benefits enjoyed by foreign corporations
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defendant may remove the action from state to federal court,
thereby circumventing the plaintiff's traditional right to choice of
venue. 81 Second, the plaintiff loses the right to a jury tria1. 82 Third,
the plaintiff must adhere to service of process requirements as de
tailed in the FSIA, which if not followed may result in a dismissal of
the action. 83 Fourth, the FSIA does not allow for in rem attach
ment of property of a defendant that is within the FSIA's protec
tion. 84 Finally, when the foreign defendant is actually a government
or political subdivision, not an agency or instrumentality, the plain
tiff loses the right to punitive damages. 85
In the case of a foreign-government-owned corporation, the
key to obtaining these benefits is to fit within the FSIA's definition
of "foreign state." Section 1603(a) defines a "foreign state" as fol
lows: "A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b). "86
that qualify under the FSIA and the substantive rights of the plaintiff which are lost as a
result).
81. See 28 U.S.c. § 1391(f) (1994).
82. See id. § 1330. The automatic loss of the plaintiffs Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial has been the subject of numerous law review articles claiming that, in this
respect, the FSIA might be unconstitutional. See Abir, supra note 9; Kimberly K. Hill,
Note, Foreign Government-Owned Corporations, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
and the Right to Jury Trial, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1071.
83. Section 1608(b) provides different rules for service of process depending on
whether the defendant is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state. See 28 U.S.c. § 1608(b). Thus, the plaintiff must first anticipate that the defend
ant will claim immunity and then accurately predict whether the defendant will qualify
as a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality, or risk losing his or her claim
altogether.
84. See id. § 1609. Consequently, if a plaintiff does not attach the defendant's
property, and later finds that the defendant is not within the FSIA, the plaintiff may
lose the ability to procure an in rem attachment, because the defendant has removed
the property. Alternatively, if a plaintiff, unaware that the defendant is a foreign state,
does attach the defendant's property, but later discovers that the defendant is within the
FSIA, the plaintiff finds that the property is now immune from attachment. See id.;
Hoffman, supra note 15, at 573-74.
85. See 28 U.S.c. § 1606. Punitive damages, however, are allowed when the en
tity being sued is an agency odnstrumentality of a foreign state, as would be the case
with any foreign· owned-corporation. See id.
86. Id. § 1603(a). Congress elaborated on the text of section 1603(a), explaining
that the term "foreign state" as used in every other section of the Act, except section
1608, includes "not only the foreign state but also political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the foreign state." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613.
Section 1608 contains 'service of process provisions which differ depending on
whether the entity is a foreign state or political subdivision as compared to an agency or
instrumentality. See 28 U.S.c. § 1608.
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The FSIA's definition of foreign state thus explicitly includes enti
ties which are "agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state."
Section 1603(b) defines "agencies and instrumentalities" as follows:
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivi
sion thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States
as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country.87

A crucial issue for foreign-government-owned corporations, and
the first issue a court must address in a suit involving such a corpo
ration, is whether the defendant corporation satisfies the FSIA's
definition of agency and instrumentality.
4.

Majority Owned by a Foreign State Requirement of
Section 1603(b)(2)

By definition, when a foreign corporation is directly majority
owned by a foreign state, it is granted the FSIA's protection. 88 Fre
quently, however, a corporation is not directly majority owned by a
foreign state, but is instead majority owned by another corporation
which, in turn, is directly majority owned by a foreign state, through
a hierarchical system of ownership.89 This corporate structure, reCongress further explained the second criterion, stating that "the entity [must] be
either an organ of a foreign state (or of a foreign state's political subdivision), or that a
majority of the entity's shares or other ownership interest be owned by a foreign state
(or by a foreign state's political subdivision)." H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
87. 28 U.S.c. § 1603(b) (1994).
88. Congress elaborated on the majority requirement, explaining that where "en
tities are entirely owned by a foreign state, they would of course be included within the
definition." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
However, "[w]here ownership is divided between a foreign state and private interests,
the entity will be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state only if a
majority of the ownership interests (shares of stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign
state or by a foreign state's political subdivision." Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6614.
89. See BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 100; see also Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsid
iary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM. L. REv. 227, 227-28, 228 n.8 (1990)
(providing a general explanation of the parent/subsidiary relationship; stating that ben
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ferred to by the courts as "tiering," has become common in recent
years, as a greater number of foreign governments become involved
in commercial pursuits. 90 When an action is brought by a United
States plaintiff against such a corporatioh, in which a foreign gov
ernment maintains a controlling interest through one or more inter
mediate corporations, the defendant corporation typically claims to
be a foreign state within the definition of the FSIA.
The issue courts face in these instances is whether tiering of
ownership interests is permissible under the FSIA, thereby afford
ing the defendant foreign corporate subsidiary the benefits ac
corded to all "foreign states" by the FSIA.
II.
A.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT

OF

TIERING UNDER THE FSIA

Tiering-The First Twenty Years
1.

Courts Routinely Allow Tiering

In early cases under the FSIA, courts uniformly held that cor
porations not directly owned by a foreign state but with indirect ties
to a foreign state through a "tiered" corporate structure fell within
the protection of the FSIA.91 Courts simply looked to the percent
age of indirect ownership that could be attributed to the foreign
state, and if it was over 50 percent, found the defendant corporation
within the FSIA.92
efits in this hierarchical corporate arrangement lie in its use as a tool for limited liability
and choice of law, as well as for tax planning).
90. See BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 8; see also Matthew D. Riven, Comment, The
Attempted Takeover of LTV by Thomson: Should the United States Regulate Inward
Investment by Foreign State-Owned Enterprises?, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 759, 768-74
(1993) (providing reasons for the large number of state-owned industries in Europe,
industries that in the United States remain privately owned). In the last few decades,
Western European nations have invested heavily in industry, especially in fields of high
technology. See id. at 768. Governments see strong national technology as a sign of
prestige and believe that an infusion of state capital is the best way to develop this
technology. See id. at 773-74 (citing HANS MORGENTIiAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
94-95 (2d ed. 1954». "If the technological venture is successful, the government will
reap not only prestige, but also a commercial profit." Id. at 774.
91. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir.
1993); Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta,
S.p.A., 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992); O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. "Americana", 734
F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. Courts allowing tiering have usually accepted the defendant corporation's af
fidavit with no questions. See, e.g., O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. "Americana", 566 F.
Supp. 1381, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984). Because plaintiffs
rarely challenged a court's finding of majority ownership, the issue of whether the FSIA
permits tiering was not analyzed by a federal court of appeals until Gates v. Victor Fine
Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
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In O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M. V. "Americana,"93 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
the FSIA applied to an Italian shipping line in a tiered corporate
structure, because its parent corporation, FINMARE, was so linked
to the Italian government that it qualified as a political subdivi
sion. 94 The Second Circuit held that because FINMARE was a
political subdivision of Italy, and the majority of shares in the de
fendant shipping line were under the direct control of FINMARE,
then the defendant shipping line clearly qualified as an agency or
instrumentality under the FSIA.95 The court stated "[t]he fact that
the Italian Government saw fit to double-tier its administrative
agencies did not compel a holding to the contrary."96
Later courts used O'Connell to hold that indirectly held major
ity ownership interests by themselves were sufficient to qualify an
entity for inclusion within the FSIA as an agency or instrumental
ity.97 These courts interpreted section 1603(b) as requiring only
that the defendant corporation be majority controlled by a foreign
state, regardless of whether the foreign state actually held owner
93. 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984).
94. See id. at 116-17. FINMARE was an Italian government-owned corporation
charged with coordinating the government's commercial enterprises. See id. at 116.
95. See id. at 116. See supra Part LC.3 for the text of section 1603(b)(2) of the
FSIA, which allows an entity to qualify for agency or instrumentality status because it is
majority owned by a foreign political subdivision.
96. O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 116. This language has often been interpreted by
courts as authority to allow tiering when the parent corporation is an agency or instru
mentality. See infra note 96. Interestingly, in O'Connell, the district court for the
Southern District of New York had found that the defendant corporation qualified
under the FSIA because of its indirect ownership by Italy. See O'Connell, 566 F. Supp.
at 1385. The district court categorically rejected the plaintiff's argument that the de
fendant corporation should not be considered a "foreign state" within the FSIA be
cause the indirectly tiered ownership made the defendant too remote from
governmental control. See id. Instead, the district court reasoned that the requirement
of section 1603(b)(l) that an agency or instrumentality have a separate legal identity
showed congressional intent that '''corporate form'-in and of itself-be immaterial to
the relevant determination." Id. On appeal, however, while affirming the district
court's finding of agency within the FSIA, the Second Circuit made clear that the find
ing was based not on indirect ownership by Italy, but the fact that the parent corpora
tion was a political subdivision of Italy. See O'Connell, 734 F.2d at 116-17. "According
to the legislative history of the FSIA, political subdivisions were intended to include 'all
governmental units beneath the central government.' FINMARE fits comfortably
within this definition." Id. (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.AN. 6604, 6613).
97. See, e.g., Talbot v. Saipem AG., 835 F. Supp 352 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Trump Taj
Mahal Assocs. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Aguste S.p.A, 761 F. Supp 1143
(D.N.I. 1991), affd without opinion, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992); New York Bay Co. v.
State Bank, No. 93-Civ-6075, 1994 WL 369406 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1994); Rutkowski v.
Occidental Chern. Corp., No. 83-C-2339, 1988 WL 107342 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1988).
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ship shares in the defendant corporation. 98 These courts often cited
O'Connell in holding that the form of ownership should not defeat
the broad congressional intent of including foreign corporations
that are owned, directly or indirectly, by a foreign state. 99 Courts
examining this issue noted "that ... ownership interest is ... 'indi
rect' ... is immaterial,"loo and "we focus on substance rather than
the corporate form."lol Thus, in the first two decades of interpret
ing the FSIA, courts allowed "tiering" of indirect ownership.
2.

Courts Move Away from Tiering

In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Federal
Insurance Co. v. Richard 1. Rubin & Co., 102 hinted in dicta that
"tiering" might not actually be allowed under the FSIA. In Rubin,
the district court, citing O'Connell, found that the defendant corpo
ration qualified as an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA be
cause its parent corporation was an agency or instrumentality of the
Dutch government. 103 Although FSIA application was not at issue
in this case, the Third Circuit specifically noted that a corporation
might not qualify as an agency under the FSIA merely because it is
majority owned by an entity which does qualify as an agency under
the FSIA.104
98. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir.
1993). In Allendale, the defendant Zenith Corporation was easily found to be within
the FSIA because its parent company was majority owned by the French government.
In an unusual twist, the court's finding of agency within the FSIA benefitted the plain
tiffs by providing the court jurisdiction over a case involving a warehouse fire in France.
The court found that the defendant fell within the commercial exception, and the plain
tiffs were able to bring a suit that otherwise would have been lost to the French courts.
See id. at 427-28.
99. See, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 n.5 (1995) ("The
fact that Israel's ownership interest in Dead Sea is 'indirect' ... is immaterial."); Talbot
v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding "[t]hat Saipem's
ownership by the Italian government is indirect is immaterial" (citations omitted));
Rutowski, 1988 WL 107342, at *1. ("[T]here is no question that, by holding majority
positions, Quebec controlled each of the corporations down this chain. Because we
focus on substance rather than the corporate form employed by Canada, we hold that
ACL is an 'instrumentality' of Canada." (citations omitted)).
100. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1318 n.5.
101. Rutowski, 1988 WL 107342, at *1.
102. 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993).
103. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard 1. Rubin & Co., No. 92-4177, 1993 WL 21327,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993), rev'd, 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993).
104. See Federal Ins. Co., 12 F.3d at 1285 n.12 (specifically attributing the reason
ing only to Judge Greenberg). The court used the text of section 1603(b) to show Judge
Greenberg's reasoning that to qualify as an agency of a foreign state, the defendant
corporation must be majority owned by a foreign state, not another agency. See id.
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Not all courts had such reservations. In Linton v. Airbus In
dustrie,105 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted, again in
dicta, that indirect ownership by a foreign state should be allowed
under the FSIA.106 The court stated the following:
The controlling statute ... erects no explicit bar to the methods
by which a foreign state may own an instrumentality, merely re
quiring that the entity claiming immunity-not its parent-have
'a majority of [its] shares or other ownership interest ... owned
by a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof.' There is no
mention of 'voting' or 'control' majority, thus equitable or bene
ficial majority ownership is not expressly prohibited from
serving. 107

The contrasting views of the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeal foreshadowed a clear division of opinion on this issue.
B.

The Circuits Divide

In recent years, the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have split over the proper interpretation of the re
quirements of section 1603(b) of the FSIA in cases where the for
eign corporation defendant is not directly majority owned by a
foreign state. lOB Conflicting interpretations of sections 1603(a) and
(b) resulted in the Ninth Circuit requiring direct ownership by the
foreign state, and the Seventh Circuit allowing indirect ownership
through tiers of intermediate owners, as long as a majority of shares
can eventually be traced back to the foreign state. 109
1.

The Ninth Circuit-No Tiering Allowed

In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,llo a California pork processing
plant, Golden Gate Fresh Foods ("GGFF"), which went by the
trade name of Victor Fine Foods, abruptly closed down the com
pany and terminated its employees without notice, in violation of
105. 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994).
106. See id. at 598 n.29. "Tiering" had not been allowed by the district court but
the issue had not been raised on appeal. See Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F. Supp.
650, 653-54 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that tiering was not allowed because one of the
parent corporations was not majority owned by a foreign state). See infra note 142 for
a discussion of the related "pooling" issue, which was the primary issue of this case.
107. Linton, 30 F.3d at 598 n.29 (citation omitted).
108. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932 (7th Cir. 1996); Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
109. The Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue of tiering under section
1603(b). See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 547 n.66.
110. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
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several U.S. labor laws. 111 GGFF employees brought suit against
GGFF, its parent company Fletcher Fine Foods ("FFF"), a Cana
dian corporation, and the parent company of FFF, Alberta Pork
Producers. Alberta Pork Producers was a Canadian marketing
agent set up by the Canadian government.1 12
Alberta Pork and FFF moved to dismiss the action, alleging
that they qualified for foreign immunity under the FSIA.u3 In de
nying the motion to dismiss, the District Court for the Eastern Dis
trict of Louisiana assumed that the FSIA protected the two
companies, but that they were not completely immune from suit
because their actions fell within the commercial activities excep
tion.1 14 The defendants appealed.
GGFF employees claimed that Alberta Pork and FFF were not
"foreign states" as defined in the FSIA, and therefore were not en
titled to FSIA protection. u5 The two defendants claimed both that
they were "foreign states" within the FSIA, and that they carried
out the work of the Canadian government, and thus did not fall
within the commercial exception. 116 The court held that Alberta
Pork, as a marketing board created and closely supervised by the
Alberta Agricultural Products Marketing Council, a governmental
unit, was an organ of the Canadian government, and thus, by defini
tion, clearly qualified as an agency under section 1603(b).H7 How
ever, in regard to Alberta Pork's subsidiary, FFF, now considered
to be owned by an agency, the court faced the issue of whether
111. See id. at 1459.
112. See id. Alberta Pork was established pursuant to the Alberta Marketing of
Agricultural Products Act, under which all hog producers in Alberta must sell their
hogs to Alberta Pork. Alberta Pork would then sell the hogs to pork processors in
Canada and abroad, including the United States. Under the Canadian act, Alberta
Pork was authorized to buy businesses such as FFF. See id. at 1460-61.
113. See id. at 1459.
114. See id. See supra Part 1.C.2 for a discussion of the exceptions to absolute
immunity allowed under 28 U.S.c. § 1605.
115. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459-60.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1460-61. The GGFF employees argued that Alberta Pork could
not be an organ of Canada because of the presumption of independence that tradition
ally has been accorded to agencies of a foreign state. However, the court noted that the
issue of whether a particular entity was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
for purposes of the FSIA was completely different from the issue of whether a particu
lar entity was an agency or instrumentality for purposes of traditional agency law. See
id. at 1460 n.1. "The use of the single term 'agency' for two purposes ... may cause
some confusion." Id. (quoting Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879
F.2d 170, 177 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989».
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section 1603(b) allowed tiering. 11s
The court first examined the text of section 1603(b).1 19 It
found that the literal language of the statute required that to be an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, an entity must either be
an organ of a foreign state or have a majority of its shares owned by
a foreign state or a political subdivision. 120 Thus, the court rea
soned, because an ordinary pork processing plant could not be con
sidered an organ of a foreign state, FFF could only be an agency or
instrumentality if a majority of its shares were owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision. 121
The court rejected the defendant's argument that Alberta
Pork, as an agency or instrumentality under section 1603(b), be
came a foreign state under section 1603(a), thereby making FFF an
agency or instrumentality under section 1603(b) because it was ma
jority owned by a foreign state. 122 First, the court examined the text
of section 1603(b). The court reasoned that the statute provides
that a foreign state "includes" an agency or instrumentality, not that
it "is defined as" an agency or instrumentality.123 The court noted
that if Congress had intended an "agency or instrumentality" to lit
erally be substituted for "foreign state" in the statute, the term
"political subdivision" would likewise have to be substituted for
"foreign state. "124 It recognized that the statutory language directly
contradicts this reading because the remainder of the section draws
a distinction between "foreign states" arid "political subdivi
sions."125 Therefore, the court concluded that the clear language of
the statute indicates that Congress did not intend such an
interpretation. 126
The Ninth Circuit then examined the legislative history and
118. See id. at 1460.
119. See supra Part 1.C.3 for the complete text of section 1603(b).
120. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1461.
121. See id. at 1461-62.
122. See id. at 1462.
123. Id.
124. See id. Section 1603(a) defines a foreign state as including both a "political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 28
U.S.c. § 1603(a) (1994).
125. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462. For example, the court pointed out that section
1603(b)(2) states that an agency or instrumentality is an entity "majority owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision." The court reasoned that if section 1603(a) was
meant to apply to section 1603(b)(2), then the statute would literally have to be read as
"majority owned by a foreign state or political subdivision or agency or instrumentality
or political subdivision." Id.
126. See id.
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found that it supported the court's interpretation of the text.1 27
Congress stated that an entity falling within the FSIA is required to
be either an organ of a foreign state (or a foreign state's political
subdivision), or that a majority of the entities' shares or other own
ership interest be owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign state's
political subdivision).128 The court reasoned that Congress seemed
particularly aware of the differences between foreign states and
political subdivisions, as well as between agencies or instrumentali
ties and political subdivisions. Therefore, Congress could easily
have stated in the text of the statute that agencies could also be
majority owned by other agencies if it so intended.1 29 The court
concluded "[i]t did not."130
The Ninth Circuit further justified its decision by explaining
that the broad implications of holding that entities majority owned
by agencies become agencies within the FSIA made it "reluctan[t]
to put words in Congress' mouth."131 The court reasoned that the
FSIA already provides potential immunity to foreign states, organs
and political subdivisions of foreign states, and agencies or instru
mentalities of foreign states or political subdivisions.B2 It stated
the following:
To add to that list entities that are owned by an agency or instru
mentality would expand the potential immunity considerably be
cause it would provide potential immunity for every subsidiary in
a corporate chain, no matter how far down the line, so long as the
first corporation is an organ of the foreign state or political subdi
vision or has a majority of its shares owned by the foreign state
or political subdivision.133

The court explained that while extending sovereign immunity
to subsidiary corporations might be a desirable policy, it had no
power to do so when a careful reading of the statute plainly disal
lowed it.134
127. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
128. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462. "[T]he entity will be deemed to be an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of
stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state's political subdivi
sion." Id. (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614).
129. See id. at 1462.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. "[W]e cannot assume that Congress intended such a result when a
literal reading of the statute leads to the opposite conclusion." Id. Although no other
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Allows Tiering

In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October
31, 1994 135 ("Roselawn"), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit addressed the issue of tiering. American Eagle Flight 4184,
from Indianapolis to Chicago, had crashed in its approach to
O'Hare Airport, killing all sixty-eight people aboard. 136 Estates
and families of deceased passengers brought suits in state courts
against the airline, and the aircraft manufacturer, Avions de Trans
port Regional, G.I.E. ("ATR").
ATR, the product of an international joint venture, was di
rectly owned fifty percent by a French corporation and fifty percent
by an Italian corporation.!37 ATR claimed foreign state status
under the FSIA, arguing that indirectly, through a complicated
tiered ownership arrangement, it had approximately 62 percent
combined ownership by France and ltaly,138 The district court al
lowed ATR to remove and consolidate all of the cases in federal
court pursuant to section 1441 of the FSIA,139 The plaintiffs, de
prived of a forum in their home state as well as a jury trial,140
court of appeals has followed the reasoning of the Gates court on the issue of tiering,
three district courts have followed the Gates reasoning. See Southern Ocean Seafood
Co. v. Holt Cargo Sys., Inc., Civ.A.No. 96-5217, 1997 WL 539763 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11,
1997) (following Gates reasoning in holding that New Zealand fishing commissions
were not immune from suit because they were not owned by New Zealand, but only by
an agency or instrumentality of New Zealand); Martinez v. Dow Chern. Co., Civ.A.Nos.
95-3212, 95-3214, 1996 WL 502461 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 1996) (finding that an Israeli cor
poration, indirectly owned by Israel through three layers of corporate subsidiaries, was
not an agency under the FSIA); Gardner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that an Argentine airline was
not an agency under the FSIA when a majority of its shares were owned by Iberia
airline, which was owned by Spain); cf Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos,
S.A. de C.V. v. The M!f Respect, 89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Gates decision
that tiering is not permitted, but holding that a foreign refinery was an agency within
the FSIA because it was an organ of the Mexican government, thereby distinguishing
Gates on its facts). But see Millicom Int'! Cellular S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, Nos.
Civ.A. 96-314(RMU), 1998 WL 84601, at *9 n.5 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1998) (finding a cor
porate subsidiary to be an agency within the FSIA because it is majority owned by
another agency and negatively citing Gates).
135. 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
136. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 909 F.
Supp. 1083, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
137. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 935.
138. See id. app. A. at 948.
139. See id. at 936. 28 U.S.c. § 1441 permits removal of a civil action brought in
state court against a foreign state as defined by section 1603(a).
140. See supra Part 1.C.3 for a discussion of benefits afforded by the FSIA. A
principal argument raised by the plaintiffs was that the FSIA deprived them of their
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moved to remand on the grounds that ATR was not a foreign state
under the FSIA.141 The plaintiffs argued that ATR, owned by cor
porate intermediaries that were "agencies or instrumentalities" of ~
foreign state, could not itself claim to be an agency or instrumental
ity because, under Gates, the FSIA prohibits tiering.142 The Sev
enth Circuit did not agree 143 and found that ATR was an agency
under the FSIA because it was controlled by France, albeit indi
rectly, through intervening agencies. 144
The Roselawn court directly criticized the Gates court for its
narrow reading of the statute. 145 The Roselawn court found that
the plain language of section 1603(a) defines the term foreign state
broadly to include political subdivisions and agencies or instrumen
talities. 146 The court found that Congress clearly intended that sec
tion 1603(a)'s broad definition of foreign state be applied to all
sections of the FSIA, except section 1608, when it refers to "foreign
sovereign."147 The court observed that "[t]o limit 'foreign state' [in
section 1603(b)] to 'foreign sovereign' or 'foreign government'
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 943-47; Committee
on Int'l Litigation, New York State Bar Assoc., Foreign State Defendant'S Right to Trial
by Jury Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 26 TEX. INT'L LJ. 71 (1991)
(presenting an overview of the arguments for and against jury trials under the FSIA).
141. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 936.
142. See id. at 939. The plaintiffs presented an additional argument why ATR
could not be considered an agency under section 1603(b). Because ATR was only 50
percent owned by each of France and Italy, it was not majority owned by either. Thus,
ATR could not be considered majority owned by a foreign state, but by foreign states.
However, "pooling," or adding together minority interests of different foreign states to
create a majority of foreign ownership was, and continues to be, routinely accepted by
courts. See, e.g., Mangattu v. MN IBN Hayyan, 35 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1994). The
Roselawn court was no different. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 937-39.
143. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 941.
144. See id. To date, no other federal court of appeals and only one district court
has followed the Roselawn decision. See Millicom Int'l Cellular, S.A. v. Republic of
Costa Rica, 995 F. Supp. 14, 18 n.5 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Roselawn in holding that a
corporate subsidiary of an agency of Costa Rica is also an agency within the FSIA); cf
Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. de C.V. v. M!f Respect, 89 F.3d
650, 655 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a foreign refining company was an agency within
the FSIA, not because it was indirectly owned by Mexico, but on the alternate ground
that it was an organ of the Mexican government).
145. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 941.
146. See id. at 940.
147. See id. See supra note 86 for an explanation of the relevant portion of sec
tion 1608. The court further pointed out that Congress' awareness of the difference
between the broadly defined concept of a foreign state and the traditional concept of a
foreign government is also evident in 28 V.S.c. § 1611(b), where the text reads '''the
property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if
(1) the property is that of ... its parent foreign government . ...'" Roselawn, 96 F.3d at
940 (quoting 28 V.S.c. § 1611(b) (1994» (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
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would be to rewrite the Act, which is obviously beyond our role as
judges."148
The plaintiffs argued that to broadly include "agencies or in
strumentalities" in the term "foreign state" in section 1603(b) ne
cessitates the inclusion also of the term "political subdivision."
Section 1603(b)'s relevant language then becomes "majority of
whose shares ... is owned by a foreign state (or agency or instru
mentality or political subdivision) or political subdivision."149 In re
sponse, the Roselawn court stated that even if the reading of that
section were superfluous, the court could not alter the proper read
ing of the entire FSIA as intended by Congress. 150
In further support of its position, the court cited Congress' in
clusion of transport organizations and airlines (such as ATR)
among many possible forms that instrumentalities could take. 151
The court stated that Congress clearly intended the FSIA to include
entities exactly like the defendant ATR.152 Ultimately, the Rose
148. Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940.
149. The Gates court noted that this interpretation of the text made the reading
of section 1603(b) superfluous. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th
Cir. 1995). See supra note 125 for a discussion of this argument presented by the Gates
court.
150. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940.
151. See id. The House Report listed examples of corporations that might fall
within the FSIA, "including a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport
organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an ex
port association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or ministry
which acts and is suable in its own name." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), re
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614.
152. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940-41. In further support of its position, the Rose
lawn court cited other Seventh Circuit decisions in which corporations with indirect
foreign ownership were considered agencies within the FSIA. See id. at 941 (citing
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that two Zenith companies were agencies when 100 percent owned by corporations 90
percent owned by France); State Bank v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1986) (find
ing that a bank was an agency when 92 percent owned by Reserve Bank of India, which
was wholly owned by India); Alberti v. Impresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that a nationalized meat packing corporation operated
through an agent of the Nicaraguan government was a foreign state within the FSIA)).
In addition, the Roselawn court noted several federal decisions that it stated have al
lowed tiered ownership interests to count for ownership under the FSIA. See Rose
lawn, 96 F.3d at 941 (citing Antoine v. Atlas Thrner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 109 (6th Cir.
1995) (treating a corporation wholly owned by another corporation in turn owned by a
political subdivision of Canada as an instrumentality of a foreign state); Straub v. A.P.
Green, 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994) (considering a wholly owned subsidiary of a
corporation wholly owned by political subdivision as an instrumentality of a foreign
state); American W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 795-96 (9th Cir.
1989) (accepting that a wholly owned subsidiary of a national airline wholly owned by
Ireland was within the FSIA); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C.
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lawn court concluded that because the FSIA does not expressly re
quire direct ownership and does not expressly exclude subsidiary
corporate arrangements, tiering is allowed. 153 It stated the
following:
[S]o long as the corporate intermediaries standing between a for
eign state and a defendant seeking to invoke foreign-state status
are themselves majority-owned by a statutorily-defined "foreign
state" (which, to be explicit, includes an agency or instrumental
ity of a foreign state), such tiering of ownership interests will not
deprive the defendant of foreign state status. 154

C.

United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York Offers a New Analysis

Most recently, in the case of Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton,155 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
rejected the reasoning of both the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits
and offered a new analysis of the issue of tiering.
Hyatt Corporation ("Hyatt") sued the vice-president of a Finn
ish bank, Skopbank, in New York State Supreme Court on breach
of contract and tort claims relating to a defaulted loan.156
Skopbank was majority owned by the Finnish Government Guaran
tee Fund ("GGF"). GGF, in turn, was majority owned by the Finn
ish Government. The vice-president, Stanton, removed the action
to the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claim
ing that Skopbank was a foreign state under the FSIA, and that he,
as an employee of Skopbank, was also a foreign state within the
meaning of the FSIA.157 Hyatt moved to remand, arguing that
Cir. 1982) (finding that a wholly owned subsidiary of a nationalized Irish corporation
could be considered an instrumentality of Ireland, so that the district court's dismissal
was improper».
153. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 941.
154. Id. at 939 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31,
1994, 909 F. Supp. 1083, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996».
155. 945 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
156. See id. at 677-78. Skopbank loaned $100 million dollars to Great Cruz Bay
Development Company to build a resort hotel and condominium project on St. John.
When Great Cruz defaulted, the loan was restructured, with Hyatt Corporation becom
ing the manager of the hotel. In 1991, Skopbank foreclosed against Great Cruz, and the
resort was sold at auction to 35 Acres Associates, claimed by Hyatt to be a subsidiary of
Skopbank. Subsequently, 35 Acres terminated its management contract with Hyatt. In
its suit, Hyatt claimed that Stanton directed the foreclosure, sale, and termination of
Hyatt's contract for his own and Skopbank's personal gain. See id. at 678.
157. See id. In order to qualify as a foreign state under the Act, Stanton needed
to show both that his employer, Skopbank, was a foreign state and that he was acting in
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Skopbank could not be considered an agency or instrumentality be
cause the FSIA specifically excludes entities that are majority
owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 15S The
district court, though agreeing with the result in Gates, disagreed
with the reasoning of both the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits.
In Hyatt, the court found neither the Seventh nor Ninth Cir
cuit's reasoning persuasive, stating that section 1603(b)'s proper in
terpretation cannot be found in either the text or the legislative
history.1 59
Before the court could begin its analysis of the proper interpre
tation of section 1603(b)(2), it faced a threshold issue of whether, as
Skopbank claimed, GGF, its owner, was a political subdivision of
Finland. 160 After an extensive analysis that involved distinguishing
the Second Circuit decision in O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M. V.
"Americana ,"161 the Hyatt court found that GGF was not a political
subdivision, but an agency or instrumentality of the Finnish Gov
ernment.1 62 Thus, the court had to decide whether the FSIA inhis official capacity when he committed the acts upon which he was being sued. See id.
at 679 (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990)).
158. See id. at 680.
159. See id. at 688.
160. See id. at 680. If the court had agreed, then clearly Skopbank would have
been an agency or instrumentality under the plain language of section 1603(b).
.
161. 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra Part ILA.1 for a discussion of
O'Connell.
162. See Hyau, 945 F. Supp. at 685. The Hyatt court recognized that a split ex
isted among courts as to the proper test to use in determining whether an entity is a
'''political subdivision" or an "agency or instrumentality" under the FSIA. See id. at
680-85. Some courts, including O'Connell, have applied a "core function" test, which
finds that an entity is a political subdivision if the central role is governmental in nature,
and an agency or instrumentality if the central role is commercial. See Transaero Inc. v.
La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Other courts have ap
plied a "legal characteristics" test, which examines the legal separateness of the entity
from the foreign state (if it can sue or be sued, hold property, or contract in its own
name). See Bowers v. Transportes Navieros Ecuadorianos (Transnave), 719 F. Supp.
166, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The Hyatt court declined to follow O'Connell, finding that
congressional intent, apparent in the text and legislative history of the FSIA, was for
political subdivisions to mean all governmental units that cannot act and may not be
sued in their own name. By contrast, agencies or instrumentalities would mean govern
mental units which can act and may be sued in their own name. Thus, the court fol
lowed the "legal characteristics" test, and found that GGF was an agency of the Finnish
government. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 681-84.
The court in Hyau declined to follow three other courts that had already found
that GGF was a political subdivision. Two of the decisions, Balentine v. Union Mort
gage Co., 795 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ill. 1992) and Murray v. Union Mortgage Co., No. 91
0799-RV-M, 1992 WL 247409 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 14, 1992), were decided when Skopbank
was actually owned by the Bank of Finland. In addition, the Hyatt court specifically
declined to follow the reasoning of Government Guarantee Fund of Finland v. Great
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eludes entities that are majority owned by an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.
The court first looked to the FSIA's text and noted that sec
tions 1603(a) and (b) directly contradict each other.163 The court
observed that the legislative history is equally contradicory.l64 The
court further stated that the Second Circuit had never addressed
the issue of tiering165 so, contrary to the defendant's arguments,
O'Connell was not controlling. 166 The court then recognized the
Cruz Bay Development Co., Civ. No. 1991-355, slip op. at 6 (D.V.1. Dec. 7, 1994), stat
ing that the District Court for the Virgin Islands had merely accepted GGF's characteri
zation of itself with no analysis and furthermore that the case had been decided before
the Ninth Circuit had decided Gates. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 690. But see Govern
ment Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 960 F. Supp. 931, 935 n.2
(D.V.1. 1997) (rejecting the result in Hyatt and finding that GGF was a political subdivi
sion, and therefore Skopbank was an agency within the FSIA).
163. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 685. Like the Gates court, the Hyatt court found
that following the directive of section 1603(a) literally, substituting "foreign state or
political subdivision or agency or instrumentality" for "foreign state" in section 1603(b)
produces the superfluous reading of "majority owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision or political subdivision or agency or instrumentality." Id. Yet, the court
recognized that a literal reading of section 1603(b) to mean only majority owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision would directly contradict the directive of section
1603(a). See id. at 686.
164. See id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614). The court observed that Congress used exactly the same
terms found in the statute when discussing the majority owned requirement of section
1603(b), including the term "political subdivision" but omitting the term "agency or
instrumentality." Thus, neither the House nor the Senate Committee Reports shed any
new light on this dilemma. See id. It should be noted that the House and Senate
Reports are identical. See S. REp. No. 94-1310 (1976).
165. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 686. The court noted that while other courts have
cited O'Connell as supporting the proposition that indirect ownership is allowed under
the FSIA, a careful reading of O'Connell indicates that the court actually held that the
defendant's parent company was a political subdivision, not an agency or instrumental
ity. See id. See supra note 97 for a list of cases that have relied upon O'Connell in
holding that the FSIA permits tiering. The Hyatt court also reasoned that because the
O'Connell court failed to analyze or even mention the implications of allowing tiering,
it must therefore have never intended to allow tiering. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 686.
In addition, the Hyatt court stated that if the O'Connell court had in fact allowed tier
ing, the courts in Gates and Roselawn would certainly have cited it. Thus, the Hyatt
court reasoned, O'Connell could not have decided the issue of tiering. See id.
166. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 686. Ironically, if the Hyatt court had followed the
O'Connell analysis on the threshold issue of whether GGF was a political subdivision or
agency, the court would likely have found GGF to be a political subdivision and thus
Skopbank would clearly have been included within the FSIA. The O'Connell court
determined that the term political subdivision broadly includes all governmental units
beneath the central government (the "core function" test) regardless of whether the
entity has a separate legal identity (the "legal characteristics" test). See O'Connell, 734
F.2d at 116-17. The Hyatt court interpreted the term political subdivision more nar
rowly, and in doing so, declined to follow O'Connell. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 684.
See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "core function"
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circuit split created by the Roselawn and Gates decisions, conclud
ing that the solution to the tiering issue could not be found merely
by looking at the FSIA's text and legislative history.167
The Hyatt court then inferred Congress' intentions from the
FSIA's ambiguous language and four other factors.168 First, the
court recognized the "separate entity" rule as the prevailing inter
national rule, and a rule sometimes applied by pre-FSIA courtS.169
Second, the court found that in the FSIA, Congress explicitly re
jected the presumption of corporate independence that is the basis
for the "separate entity" rule po Third, the Hyatt court echoed the
Gates court in pointing out the remoteness of subsidiary corpora
tions from actual governmental control. l7l Finally, the Hyatt court
listed the serious implications of allowing tiering. The loss of a right
to a jury trial,l72 potential problems in obtaining personal jurisdic
tionp3 loss of the traditional right to choice of forum,174 and a
shifting of the burden of production when proving that one of the
FSIA's exceptions to immunity applies I75 are all serious conse
test as opposed to the "legal characteristics" test and the Hyatt court's determination of
whether GGF was a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality.
167. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 688. The court also noted that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York had already expressly followed the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Gates. See id. at 687 (citing Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v.
Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1995».
168. See id. at 690.
169. See id. at 688. Under the "separate entity" rule, corporations with a separate
legal existence are presumed to be independent from the foreign state and thus are
denied sovereign immunity. For a complete explanation of the "separate entity" rule,
see Hoffman, supra note 15, at 542-43; see also supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the
"separate entity" rule.
170. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 688. See Part 1.C.3 for the text of section
1603(b)(1), which requires an agency or instrumentality to have a separate legal exist
ence from the foreign state (yet still allows the entity to qualify for sovereign
immunity).
171. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 688-89.
172. See id. at 689.
173. See id. If a corporation falls within the FSIA, the terms of the commercial
activity exception rather than the particular state's long arm statute serves as the basis
for obtaining personal jurisdiction. Under the FSIA, the act establishing the nexus to
the United States must be the same as the act giving rise to the claim. See 28 U.S.c.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1994); see also Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of China,
822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987); Hoffman, supra note 15, at 574-75. Thus, the Hyatt court
noted that there will be situations where a plaintiff will not be able to obtain jurisdiction
even though personal jurisdiction could be obtained through the state's long-arm stat
ute. As an example, the court cited Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1984). See Hyatt, 945 F.
Supp. at 689.
174. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 689.
175. See id. Prior to the FSIA, a defendant foreign corporation carried the com
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quences that befall a plaintiff whenever a foreign defendant is in
cluded within the FSIA.176 The court concluded that Congress
would have been more explicit if it indeed had intended such far
reaching consequences. 177 Thus, the Hyatt court held that the FSIA
does not allow tiering. 178

III.

A

FRESH EXAMINATION OF THE TIERING ISSUE

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits both employed traditional
methods of statutory interpretation to arrive at their respective so
lutions to the issue of tiering. The Ninth Circuit, in Gates v. Victor
Fine Foods,179 then looked at the broad implications of allowing
tiering and concluded that Congress could not have intended to al
low tiering. 180 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit, in In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994,181 concluded
that Congress intended to allow tiering according to the plain lan
guage of the statute and its legislative history.182 The Roselawn
court added that whatever the practical implications of allowing
tiering, a court's proper role in interpreting a statute is merely to
carry out congressional intent. 183
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, in Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton,184 finding the plain language
of the statute ambiguous, the legislative history unhelpful, and the
reasoning of neither the Ninth nor the Seventh Circuits persuasive,
formed its understanding of section 1603(b) from an historical view
of sovereign immunity before the enactment of the FSIA.185 The
plete burden of proof to establish that sovereign immunity applied. See Hoffman, supra
note 15, at 584; Kane, supra note 43, at 415-16. Under the FSIA, once the defendant
proves that it is a foreign state, the plaintiff must carry the burden of production that an
exception applies. At that point, the defendant corporation has the burden of proof
regarding the issue of whether an exception actually applies. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at
689 (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W.
Galadari, 12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993».
176. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 689.
177. See id. at 690. Accordingly, the court stated that "[i]f Congress so intended,
I believe it would have been as explicit as it was in extending immunity to corporations
majority-owned by foreign states or their political subdivisions." Id. The court cited
Hoffman, supra note 15, in support of this reasoning. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 688.
178. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 690.
179. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
180. See id. at 1462.
18l. 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
182. See id. at 940.
183. See id.
184. 945 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
185. See id. at 688.

418

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:387

Hyatt court found that the FSIA, by plain language, already en
larged the scope of sovereign immunity by including foreign-gov
ernment-owned corporations. 186 The Hyatt court reasoned that if
Congress intended to so drastically depart from past practice as to
also extend immunity protection to all subsidiaries of foreign-gov
ernment-owned corporations, Congress would surely have dis
cussed the issue somewhere in the text or legislative history.187
Therefore, the Hyatt court concluded that tiering should not be
allowed. 188
This Note examines the text and the legislative history of sec
tion 1603(b) and concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct in its
determination that Congress never intended to extend immunity
protection to corporations merely because they are majority owned
by an agency or instrumentality. This Note next examines the
slightly different issue of whether Congress intended to grant im
munity benefits to corporations that are indirectly majority owned
by a foreign state, through controlling ownership in intermediate
corporations. This Note acknowledges that the FSIA's text and leg
islative history do not reveal a clear congressional intent to require
direct ownership. This Note suggests, however, that a requirement
of direct ownership better fulfills the FSIA's clearly stated
purposes.
This Note then suggests that the Hyatt court was correct in its
common sense historical approach to the problem of tiering. This
Note builds on the Hyatt court's reasoning by contrasting a tradi
tional governmental instrumentality with the purely commercial
corporation that typically seeks FSIA immunity benefits. This Note
suggests that the reasons for granting immunity benefits to tradi
tional instrumentalities do not exist for these subsidiary corpora
tions. Finally, this Note includes a comparative view of sovereign
immunity as practiced in other countries. This Note observes that it
makes no sense for United States courts to extend immunity bene
fits to foreign-government-owned corporations when other coun
tries do not extend similar protections. This Note concludes that
tiering of indirect ownership interests should not be allowed under
the FSIA.

186.
187.
188.

See id.
See id. at 689-90.
See id. at 690.
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Does the FSIA Include Corporations Because They Are
Majority Owned by an Agency or Instrumentality?
1. Plain Language of the Text

In defining an agency or instrumentality, section 1603(b)(2)
clearly states "majority ... owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision ...."189 It does not add "or agency or instrumentality."
Thus, according to the plain language of the text, an agency or in
strumentality may be majority owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision, but not by another agency or instrumentality.
The Seventh Circuit in Roselawn reasoned that because section
1603(a) states that the term "foreign state" includes "a political sub
division of a foreign state or agency or instrumentality," section
1603(b)(2) must be read "majority owned by a foreign state (in
cluding an agency or instrumentality) or political subdivision." The
Ninth Circuit in Gates was correct, however, in noting that the text
then becomes redundant, as section 1603(b)(2) then literally reads
"majority owned by a foreign state (including a political subdivision
or agency or instrumentality) or political subdivision."19o As the
Ninth Circuit reasoned, if Congress intended this interpretation, it
could have easily avoided the redundant aspect of this reading by
simply stating that an entity must be majority owned by a foreign
state, political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality.191
Neither the Gates nor Roselawn courts considered the fact that
section 1603 is a definition section, in which each term is separately
explained for correct use in later sections of the statute. 192 If Con
gress intended that an agency or instrumentality could be majority
owned by another agency or instrumentality, it clearly could have
stated so in its definition of agency or instrumentality.193 Of course,
189. 28 u.s.c. § 1603(b)(2) (1994).
190. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (sug
gesting that the literal language of the statute forbids the inclusion of entities majority
owned by an agency or instrumentality); see also Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 687 (citing the
reasoning specifically attributed to Judge Greenberg in Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I.
Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1285 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993), that Congress' explicit use of the
term "political subdivision" in section 1603(b )(2) precludes the possibility that Congress
intended to implicitly also include entities that are majority owned by an agency or
instrumentality); Southern Ocean Seafood Co. v. Holt Cargo Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 96
5217,1997 WL 539763, at *5 n.9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1997) (citing the dictum in Federal
Ins. Co. that the language of section 1603(b)(2) precludes a finding that majority own
ership by an agency or instrumentality is allowed under the FSIA).
191. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
192. See 28 U.S.c. § 1603. The section begins, "Definitions. For purposes of this
chapter . ..." Id. (emphasis added).
193. See 28 U.S.c. § 1603(b). See supra Part 1.C.3 for the text of section 1603(b).
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it is possible that Congress intended to leave it up to the reader of
section 1603(b) to realize that the preceding subsection had altered
the commonly understood plain meaning of the term "foreign
state," to substitute the appropriate phrases, and to accept the re
sulting superfluous language. However, it is more reasonable to as
sume that Congress meant exactly what the plain language of
section 1603(b)(2) says: that the entity be majority owned by a for
eign state or political subdivision, and that a foreign state does not
include an agency or instrumentality for this purpose. 194
2.

Legislative History Supports the Plain Language of
the Text

The Roselawn court found that whenever Congress used the
term "foreign state," it actually intended "foreign state, political
subdivision, and agency or instrumentality."195 The Roselawn court
supported this interpretation with reference to the House Report
which states that section 1603(a)'s definition of "foreign state" ap
plies to all provisions of the Act except section 1608, where it refers
only to a foreign sovereign. 196 According to the Roselawn court,
Congress carefully distinguished between a "foreign state," which
includes agencies and instrumentalities, and a "foreign sovereign"
which does not. 197 The Roselawn court thus found that the lan
guage of section 1603(b)(2), "majority whose shares or other own
ership interest is owned by a foreign state" clearly means "owned
by a foreign state or agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."198
The Gates court, on the other hand, found that Congress,
aware of the difference between "organs and political subdivisions
of foreign states," and "agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
states," intentionally included the former in section 1603(b)(2), but
194. See Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. v. M!T Respect, 89
F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating, in dicta, that an "entity wholly owned by an
'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' is not owned by a 'foreign state or a polit
ical subdivision thereof and therefore does not meet the definition of § 1603 (b)(2)").
195. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932, 940 (7th Cir. 1996).
196. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613. The court also noted that a distinction between "foreign
state" and "foreign government" is made in section 1611(b) which states that the prop
erty of a "foreign state" is immune from attachment if the property is that of its parent
"foreign government." See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940.
197. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940.
198. See id. (stating that "[t]o limit 'foreign state' to 'foreign sovereign' or 'for
eign government' would be to rewrite the Act, which is obviously beyond our role as
judges").
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not the latter. 199 Because Congress so carefully distinguished be
tween the terms in the House Report, the Gates court reasoned, it
would also have been careful about the use of these terms in the
text. 2OO
One passage of the House Report that neither court consid
ered states that "[w]here ownership is divided between a foreign
state and private interests, the entity will be deemed to be an
agency of a foreign state only if a majority of the ownership inter
ests (shares of stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision. "201 The fact that Congress stated an entity
will only be an agency if owned by a foreign state or political subdi
vision confirms the narrow holding of the Gates court. The Rose
lawn court was mistaken in assuming that Congress intended to
implicitly include entities that are also majority owned by agencies
or instrumentalities.
The Roselawn court looked to a list of entities that Congress
stated could constitute agencies or instrumentalities within the
FSIA.202 The Roselawn court went too far, though, in using the fact
that Congress listed airlines such as the defendant corporation ATR
as proof that Congress intended to allow tiering. 203 The House Re
port nowhere suggests that the listed entities will always fit the defi
nition of agencies and instrumentalities. It merely states that these
entities could be included, but only if they meet the other require
ments of an agency.204
199. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the entity must be "either an organ of a foreign state (or of a foreign state's polit
ical subdivision), or that a majority of the entity's shares or other ownership interest be
owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign state's political subdivision)") (quoting H.R.
REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614). For a discussion of
the relevant text of the House Report, see supra notes 86 and 88.
200. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
201. H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614 (em
phasis added).
202. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940 (pointing to the statement in the House Report
that instrumentalities can assume many different forms). "As a general matter, entities
which meet the definition of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' could
assume a variety of forms, including a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a
transport organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central
bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or
ministry which acts and is suable in its own name." H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15-16,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
203. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 940-41 (stating that even if the literal reading of the
text became superfluous, the court must follow the broad intent of the FSIA, "in which
corporations with ATR's precise characteristics may be considered an agency or instru
mentality of a foreign state").
204. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
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An analysis of the text and legislative history therefore con
firms the correctness of the Gates holding, that Congress did not
intend to broadly extend FSIA protections to foreign-government
owned corporations merely because they are majority owned by an
agency or instrumentality. The Gates holding, however, is not a
completely satisfactory solution to the issue of tiering, for it leaves
unanswered a larger question: may a foreign-government-owned
corporation qualify for FSIA benefits, not because its parent corpo
ration is an agency, but because a majority of its ownership shares
or other ownership interests can ultimately be traced to a foreign
state?

B. A Restatement of the Issue: Does the FSIA Include
Corporations That Are Indirectly Majority Owned by a
Foreign State?
A restatement of the issue of tiering to focus on the amount of
ownership interest that can be attributed, albeit indirectly, to a for
eign state turns the attention away from the sleight of statutory lan
guage analysis engaged in by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and
focuses on issues of control as accepted by pre-Gates courtS. 205 In
direct ownership by a foreign state had qualified foreign corpora
tions for sovereign immunity for almost two decades following the
passage of the FSIA with little or no analysis. 206 The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits are the only courts of appeals that have directly ana
lyzed the issue of tiering, and both courts based their reasoning on
majority ownership by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state. 207 The issue of whether indirect ownership interests of a for
eign state may count for section 1603(b)'s majority ownership re
quirement has not to date been directly analyzed by a court of
appeals.
The House Report specifically states that "[a]n entity which does not fall within the
definitions of sections of 1603 (a) or (b) would not be entitled to sovereign immunity in
any case before a Federal or State court." Id.
205. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of courts' treatment of the issue of tier
ing before the current circuit split. For a discussion of the two separate questions
presented by the issue of tiering, see Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.
1996), where tiering was allowed, but was limited to cases where the parent corporation
had a direct majority ownership by a foreign state.
206. See Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 939. The Roselawn court observed that until very
recently, courts did not require direct majority ownership by a foreign state. "[N]early
all courts which have confronted indirect or 'tiered' ownership situations have consid
ered majority state-owned corporations to be 'agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
states' under the FSIA ...." Id.
207. See supra Part 1I.B.1-2 for discussions of the respective courts' reasoning.
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The Text and Legislative History Are Ambiguous

Section 1603(b)(2) clearly specifies that stock ownership is the
test to establish agency within the FSIA.208 Because Congress
stated "owned by," and did not include the terms "indirectly owned
by" or "controlled by" or even "attributable to," it is logical to as
sume that Congress intended to require direct ownership of a for
eign state. 209 An entity "a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivi
sion" then would plainly mean only an entity directly owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision. 210
The addition of the words "or other ownership interest" adds
ambiguity, though, to the otherwise plain meaning of the text, and
supports the alternate argument that Congress intended something
other than stock ownership, for example, indirect ownership inter
ests or control, to also be measured. 211 Conversely, had Congress
simply stated "ownership interests," without the mention of stock
ownership, section 1603(b) clearly would be broad enough to allow
indirect ownership.212
208. See 28 u.s.c. § 1603(b)(2) (1994) ("a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision").
209. The law measures ownership of a corporation differently depending on the
legal setting of the issue. See Philip 1. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enter
prise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 295, 299 (1996) (discussing the value of applying enterprise law as opposed to
traditional corporation law). When ownership of a subsidiary corporation is tiered
through an intermediate corporation, indirect ownership and ultimate control of the
subsidiary lies with the parent corporation, but legal ownership of the subsidiary resides
in the intermediate corporation that possesses the subsidiary's shares of stock.
Thus, courts have held that ownership for tax purposes requires ownership or ac
tual holding of a certain percentage of shares of stock. See id. at 300. On the other
hand, courts have held that ownership for purposes of holding a parent corporation
liable for the actions of its subsidiary (known as "piercing the veil") rests on proof of
indirect ownership or control. See id.
210. The House Report, describing the requirement of section 1603(b)(2), states
that "a majority of the entity's shares or other ownership interest [must] be owned by a
foreign state (or by a foreign state's political subdivision)." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at
15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614.
211. The House Report also reflects this ambiguity, stating that the entity will
qualify as an agency or instrumentality "only if a majority of the ownership interests
(shares of stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or a foreign state's political
subdivision." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
212. See Thad T. Dameris & Michael J. Mucchetti, Vectors to Federal Court:
Unique Approaches to Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Aviation Cases, 62 J. AIR L. &
COM. 959, 972 (1997) (arguing that the FSIA allows tiering of indirect interests). The
authors claim that because the text of section 1603(b)(2) does not state the words "di
rect" it must be assumed that Congress intended to allow indirect equitable or benefi
cial ownership interests. See id. The authors present a hypothetical, whereby a foreign
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By specifying stock ownership as the appropriate measure,
however, Congress at least intended to set direct ownership as the
standard. 213 Congress could logically have added the qualifying
"other ownership interests" to section 1603(b)'s text (and "or
otherwise" to the House Report) to include those entities with own
ership measured by something other than shares of stock, such as
government (directly) owns 49.9 percent of each tier in a chain of intermediate entities.
See id. at 973. After the second tier, the foreign government would (indirectly) own
almost 87.49 percent of the entity applying for FSIA immunity. After the third tier, the
foreign government would (indirectly) own almost 93.74 percent. "Paradoxically, if
tiering were prohibited, an entity owned almost exclusively by foreign sovereigns would
be denied FSIA immunity, while [another] entity with merely 50.01 percent direct, for
eign-sovereign ownership would enjoy such immunity." Id. at 973-74.
The author's hypothetical may be countered by another hypothetical, where
through a tiered corporate system, a foreign sovereign directly owns 50.01 percent of
the first tier. The first tier corporation has 50.01 percent direct ownership of many
second tier subsidiaries. Each second tier subsidiary has 50.01 percent direct ownership
of many. third tier subsidiaries. If tiering were allowed, and control measured instead of
actual ownership of stock, then the foreign government, through majority ownership of
the first tier corporation, would enjoy majority indirect ownership or control of all of
the entities in the tiered system. A huge number of corporations with no direct owner
ship by the foreign state would nonetheless qualify for removal to federal court and
potential sovereign immunity. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th
Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the time and effort spent litigating the amount of control actu
ally enjoyed by a particular foreign state would come at a great cost to the certainty that
the FSIA was intended to bring United States plaintiffs. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at
7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. For a discussion of the goals of the FSIA, see
infra Part III.B.3.
213. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (First
Citibank), 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (finding that a Cuban nationalized bank, an agency or
instrumentality within the FSIA, was liable for debt as an agent of the Cuban govern
ment). The Supreme Court stated that Congress set stock ownership as the measure of
an agency or instrumentality for FSIA purposes. The determination of whether a cor
poration is an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA is therefore entirely separate
from the substantive determination of whether an agency or instrumentality relation
ship exists between parent and subsidiary corporation for purposes of imposing liability.
See id. at 620-21.
The Court held that a corporation's qualification as an FSIA agency or instrumen
tality is irrelevant to proving it an agency for purposes of liability, where arguments
such as "indirect control" and "substance over form" come into play. See id. While
First Citibank did not involve the issue of tiering, the Court's discussion should make
courts wary of confusing the term "agency" for FSIA purposes with the term "agency"
as used to determine an alter ego relationship for purposes of establishing liability.
Courts should not automatically equate notions of indirect ownership and control with
section 1603(b)(2)'s statutory requirement of majority ownership of stock. See supra
note 99 for a list of cases in which courts have found agency within the FSIA using
traditional arguments of common law agency. See also Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 177 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that whether an alter
ego relationship described in terms of "agency" exists is a completely different inquiry
from determining whether an entity is an "agency" within the FSIA).
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state trading companies or governmental associations. 214 For fur
ther clarification, Congress then could have added the following re
finement: "[a]s a general matter, entities which meet the definition
of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a
variety of forms, including a state trading corporation . . . ."215
Without a clear explanation in the text or House Report, though,
the words "or other ownership interests" do leave room to interpret
the statute as either requiring direct ownership or, alternatively, al
lowing indirect ownership.
2.

A Direct Ownership Requirement Furthers the FSIA's
Broad Purpose

Although the FSIA's text and legislative history may be ambig
uous, an examination of the purpose of the FSIA lends strength to
the argument that the FSIA does not allow tiering. In enacting the
FSIA, Congress attempted to balance the competing interests of
United States citizens with the larger federal interests served by ex
tending sovereign immunity to foreign states in a manner consistent
with international standards. 216
214.

See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6614.

It is clear that Congress envisioned that entities other than traditional stock-issuing

corporations could be agencies. "As a general matter, entities which meet the defini
tion of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,' could assume a variety of forms,
including a state trading corporation ... an export association, a government procure
ment agency or a department or ministry which acts and is suable in its own name." Id.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6614.
By specifying that stock ownership is not the only way a corporation may be in
cluded within the FSIA, Congress avoided an issue that has created confusion in an
analogous legal area, that of United States-government-owned corporations. 28 U.S.c.
§ 1349 denies federal jurisdiction to "agencies" of the United States unless the United
States is the owner of more than one-half its capital stock. See 28 U.S.c. § 1349 (1994).
A split has developed in the United States courts of appeals because of a disagreement
over whether entities with no stock at all may be included within the statute's protec
tion on an alternate showing of majority control. See Burton v. United States Olympic
Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1983). For an in-depth discussion of the law's
treatment of United States agencies, see Christina Maistrellis, Comment, American Na
tional Red Cross v. S.G. & AE.: An Open Door to the Federal Courts for Federally
Chartered Corporations, 45 EMORY L.J. 771 (1996); Richard Neumig, Annotation, What
Is an "Agency" for Purposes of 28 U.S. C. § 1345, Granting Original Jurisdiction to
United States District Courts of Civil Actions by any Agency of the United States, 51
AL.R. Fed. 874 (1981).
215. H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6614.
216. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,493 (1983). "Ac
tions against foreign sovereigns ... raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign rela
tions of the United States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident. To promote
these federal interests, Congress exercised its Article I powers by enacting [the FSIA]."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Congress enacted the FSIA to provide certainty to United
States plaintiffs, by delineating exactly how, where, and when a suit
may be brought against a foreign state and its entities. 217 A re
quirement of direct ownership supports this goal in three ways.
First, it provides a clear and predictable measure that avoids litiga
tion over control issues. Second, it provides more certainty to
United States plaintiffs by limiting the number of corporations
which qualify for the benefits of the FSIA.218 Third, Congress was
aware that in some cases a United States citizen may not even know
that an entity with whom he or she is dealing has ties to a foreign
state, until after a claim is brought.219 Because direct ownership is
easier to ascertain in advance, plaintiffs face a lower risk of unfair
surprise and are better able to protect themselves by obtaining a
waiver of immunity.220
217. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1487, at 6"7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.e.e.A.N. at 6604.
Congress stated that the FSIA was to "provide when and how parties [could] maintain a
lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States and to
provide when a foreign state [was] entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. at 6, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.e.e.A.N. at 6604. See supra Part 1.e.1 for a complete discussion of Con
gress' purpose in enacting the FSIA.
218. See Gatesv. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (reasoning
that allowing tiering would extend the benefits of immunity to a vast number of entities
far beyond Congress' intentions).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.e.e.A.N. at 6605.
"[The situation may arise] when an American property owner agrees to sell land to a
real estate investor that turns out to be a foreign government entity ...." Id., reprinted
in 1976 U.S.e.C.A.N. at 6605. "In a modern world where foreign state enterprises are
every day participants in commercial activities, [the FSIA] is urgently needed legisla
tion." Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.e.e.A.N. at 6605. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 569
71 for a discussion of what Hoffman terms the "hidden identity" of foreign sovereigns
who directly own corporations.
If foreign corporations that are directly owned by a foreign government have a
"hidden identity," consider how much more of a problem is the "hidden identity" of
those corporations whose ownership by a foreign state is masked by several tiers of
intermediate corporations. While an American corporation doing business with foreign
corporations may anticipate a potential immunity question and protect itself with a
waiver, the average citizen often has no way of knowing ahead of time that a corpora
tion is indirectly majority owned by a foreign state.
220. There are many cases in which United States citizens have found that their
ability to recover damages was impacted in a negative way by the foreign corporate
defendant's indirect, and in some cases hidden, ownership by a foreign state. Consider
the sixty-four families of the Roselawn aircrash victims, who lost their right to sue in
their home state courts in front of a jury because the airline manufacturer was found to
be partially and indirectly owned by France and Italy. See In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 941 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Talbot v.
Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (involving a worker who sued for inju
ries occurring on boat indirectly majority owned by Italy); Rutkowski v. Occidental
Chern. Corp., No. 83-C-2339, 1988 WL 107342 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1988) (involving a wife
who sued a chemical corporation indirectly majority owned by Canada after her hus
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Although concerned with the rights of United States plaintiffs,
Congress nevertheless recognized that there are valid reasons why
some degree of special protection should be accorded to foreign
government-owned corporations. 221 Thereby, as the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Hyatt Corp.
v. Stanton recognized, Congress departed from the traditional im
munity treatment accorded to foreign-government-owned corpora
tions and enacted section 1603(b).222 Congress intentionally
granted certain benefits to foreign corporations that were found. to
be "foreign states" for purposes of the FSIA.223 Allowing tiering of
ownership interests, however, would carry this special consideration
beyond the state owned entities explicitly included by Congress. 224
Congress recognized the fact that most foreign-government
owned corporations are purely commercial with no governmental
purpose at all,225 yet decided to extend the presumption of govern
mental purpose to an entity that is majority owned by a foreign
government.226 Section 1603(b) explicitly delineates three require
ments that a corporation must meet in order to qualify as an agency
band died from asbestos poisoning); cf. New York Bay Co. v. State Bank of Patalia, No.
93 Civ. 6075 (WK), 1994 WL 369406 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1994) (involving FSIA jurisdic
tion so that the Christian Children's Fund could sue to recover $400,000 misappropri
ated by a bank indirectly majority owned by India); Great Am. Boat Co. v. Alsthom
Atl., Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 84-0105, 84-5442, 1987 WL 4766 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 1987) (involv
ing an engine manufacturer indirectly majority owned by France that was successfully
brought within the FSIA so that a boat company could recover damages).
221. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488-89 (stating that Congress recognized the "po
tential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a
uniform body of law in this area"); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (First .Citibank), 462 U.S. 611, 624-28 (1983) (recognizing
that Congress intended to grant certain benefits to state owned corporations that are
instrumentalities within the FSIA); Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 937 (stating that Congress in
tended to promote uniformity in cases involving foreign governments by providing "a
means of escape from potentially biased state court proceedings").
222. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
20 (1988) (stating that prior to the FSIA, a foreign-government-owned corporation was
not accorded immunity at all unless it proved that it was performing a public function).
223. See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the benefits that automatically fall to
a foreign corporation that is found to be within the FSIA.
224. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 689-90 (finding that Congress was specific in in
cluding directly state owned corporations within the FSIA).
225. See First Citibank, 462 U.S. at 624-28 (discussing in depth the nature of an
instrumentality and the reason why the FSIA accords them a separate legal personality
distinct from the foreign state).
226. This presumption may be overcome with proof of a commercial activity. See
supra Part 1.C.2 for an explanation of the interaction of the presumption of governmen
tal purpose and the commercial activity exception.
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or instrumentality.227 Congress was deliberate in stating the neces
sary criterion, to ensure that this presumption of governmental pur
pose would be extended only to those entities that fulfill all of the
statutory requirements. 228 As the Hyatt court reasoned, in light of
the vast increase in the numbers of entities that would qualify for
the benefits of the FSIA, and in light of the detrimental implica
tions that a broad interpretation of section 1603(b) would have on
United States plaintiffs, immunity benefits should not be extended
to entities beyond those that Congress explicitly included in the
FSIA.229
C.

Tiering-The Practical Reality

The Hyatt court approached the issue of tiering by pointing out
that historically, United States courts never offered the blanket pro
tection of sovereign immunity to foreign-government-owned corpo
rations. 23o The court then acknowledged that in enacting the FSIA,
Congress intentionally enlarged the scope of immunity extended to
these foreign-government-owned corporations.231 To determine
how far Congress intended to extend immunity protections, the Hy
att court looked realistically at the negative consequences tiering
has on United States plaintiffs, and concluded that tiering of indi
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994). The three criteria are (1) that the entity be a
separate legal person, (2) that the entity be either an organ of a foreign state or of a
foreign state's political subdivision, or that a majority of the entity's shares or owner
ship interests be owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state's political subdivision,
and (3) that the entity not be a citizen of the United States or incorporated under the
laws of a third country. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.AN. 6604, 6614.
228. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
The House Report specifically states that an entity not falling within the definitions of
sections 1603(a) or (b) will not be entitled to sovereign immunity in any case before
either a state or federal court. See id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6614. Con
gress' deliberateness is evidenced in the House Report's explanation for the third crite
rion. "The rationale behind these exclusions is that if a foreign state acquires or
establishes a company or other legal entity in a foreign country, such entity is presump
tively engaging in activities that are either commercial or private in nature." Id., re
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6614.
229. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 690. The Hyatt court found that the loss of a right
to a jury trial, the stricter nexus requirement for jurisdiction under the FSIA, the power
of removal to federal court, and the plaintiff's bearing the burden of production as to
the applicability of an exception are all consequences to American plaintiffs serious
enough to not allow tiering on the basis of the ambiguous language of section
1603(b)(2). See id. at 689-90. For a further discussion of the Hyatt court's reasoning,
see supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
230. See Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 688.
231. See id.
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rect ownership interests is not allowed. 232 The Hyatt decision
makes sense because it is based on a practical evaluation of the ac
tual results of tiering.
Accordingly, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana
on October 31, 1994233 was wrongly decided, not only because the
Seventh Circuit misinterpreted the interrelation between sections
1603(a) and 1603(b) ofthe FSIA, but because of the practical effect
of the decision. The Roselawn court extended foreign sovereign
immunity benefits to a commercial airline company because one of
its several parent corporations was owned by another corporation
that was owned by France and Italy. The Roselawn court extended
these benefits to the airline at a tremendous cost to American
plaintiffs, who, because those who died in the crash had bought
their airline seats on American Eagle,234 lost their right to bring suit
in their respective state courts and their right to a jury trial.235
Likewise, Gates v. Victor Fine Foods 236 was correctly decided
by the Ninth Circuit, not only because the court properly inter
preted the plain language of section 1603(b), but because the court
realized that allowing tiering extends the benefits of the FSIA to a
virtually unlimited number of commercial corporations. 237
To fully appreciate the practical effects of tiering, it is instruc
tive to examine the typical foreign-government-owned corporation
in a tiered corporate structure seeking FSIA protections today.
1.

A Traditional Instrumentality Compared to a Subsidiary
in a Multi-Tiered Corporation

In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exte
rior de Cuba (First Citibank),238 the Supreme Court examined the
nature of the government instrumentality that Congress meant to
protect in the FSIA.239 The Court observed that during this cen
tury, governments have commonly established corporations to per
form a variety of governmental tasks.240 While the organization
232. See id. at 689-90.
233. 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
234. The American Eagle plane was manufactured by ATR, which is jointly
owned by French and Italian corporations, which in tum claimed indirect ownership by
France and Italy. See id. at 935, app. A. at 948.
235. See supra Part I.C.3 for an explanation of the benefits of the FSIA.
236. 54 F.3d 157 (9th Cir. 1995).
237. See id. at 1462.
238. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
239. See id. at 624-25.
240. See id. at 624; see also W. Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Compara
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and type of governmental control of these instrumentalities may
vary, the Court found that they have certain qualities in common.241
These instrumentalities are established as separate legal entities,
and typically run as distinct economic enterprises, with a greater
degree of flexibility and independence from close political control
than normal governmental agencies. 242 The Supreme Court ob
served that in developing countries, governments establish these in
strumentalities in order to raise capital needed for large
government projects. 243 "'Public enterprise, largely in the form of
development corporations, has become an essential instrument of
economic development ...."'244 In First Citibank, the Court held
that with the FSIA, Congress specifically accorded these instrumen
talities some of the same protections traditionally accorded to for
eign states while still granting them a presumption of independence
for liability purposes, that may be overcome only through proof of a
principal and agent relationship.245
A subsidiary corporation in a tiered hierarchical foreign-gov
ernment-owned enterprise, however, is far removed from the tradi
tional foreign government instrumentality furthering the foreign
government's purposes the Supreme Court described in First Ci
tibank. 246 Indeed, a realistic view of the typical foreign-govern
ment-owned corporation is that it is entirely commercial in
purpose. 247 Traditional sovereign immunity principles have never
extended immunity to commercial corporations that have no go v
tive Analysis, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303, 306-07 (W.
Friedmann & J.F. Gamer eds., 1970).
241. See First Citibank, 462 U.S. at 624. The Court states that "[a] typical govern
ment instrumentality, if one can be said to exist, is created by an enabling statute that
prescribes the powers and duties of the instrumentality, and specifies that it is to be
managed by a board selected by the government in a manner consistent with the en
abling law." Id.
242. See id. at 624-25.
243. See id. at 625.
244. Id. (citing Friedmann, supra note 240, at 333-34).
245. Thus, assets of the foreign-government-owned corporation are treated as dis
tinct from the foreign government. See id. at 625-26, 627. '''Limited liability is the rule,
not the exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enter
prises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.'" Id. at 626 (quoting Anderson
v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
246. See Friedmann, supra note 240, at 325. "The crux of the matter is that the
public corporation is a new type of institution which has sprung from new social and
economic situations and changing functions of Government ...." Id.
247. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 566-67 (stating that the public commercial
sector is so widespread that "one may safely say that most state-owned corporations are
engaged in commercial activities"); see also R.P. Short, The Role of Public Enterprises:
An International Statistical Comparison, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES
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ernmental purpose whatsoever. 248 There is no valid reason for the
FSIA to benefit these corporations at the expense of fairness to
United States plaintiffs. 249 A requirement of direct foreign govern
ment ownership, while not ensuring the possibility, at least maxi
mizes the probability that the FSIA protects only the type of
governmental instrumentality envisioned by Congress as stated by
the Supreme Court in First eitibank.
2.

A Comparative Look at Sovereign Immunity Abroad

Following the Hyatt court's evaluation of the actual effects of
tiering, an examination of how the FSIA's immunity policy fits
within international foreign sovereign immunity standards also sup
ports a requirement of direct ownership.250
In the international community, the United States stands alone
110, 115 (Robert H. Floyd et al. eds., 1984) (presenting a study of state-owned
enterprises).
248. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 222, at 20-21. For a discussion of sovereign
immunity principles as used in United States courts, see supra Part I.A.
249. In the unusual case where an indirectly-government-owned foreign corpora
tion does serve a governmental purpose, agency status is still possible if the court finds
that the defendant corporation is an organ of the foreign government. See 42 U.S.c.
§ 1603(b)(2) (1994) ("An agency or instrumentality means any entity ... which is an
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof
...."); Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. v. M!f Respect, 89 F.3d
650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (following Gates and declining to allow tiering, but holding
that a court may find a corporate defendant to be an organ of a foreign state when: (1)
the corporation has a governmental purpose, (2) the government actively controls the
corporation, (3) the foreign government hires and compensates the corporate employ
ees, and (4) the laws of the foreign state treats the corporation as part of the govern
ment); see also Southern Ocean Seafood Co. v. Holt Cargo Sys., No. CIY.A. 96-5217,
1997 WL 539763, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1997) (finding TOWFC, a fishing commis
sion established to protect Maori rights, has a clear government purpose, and is an
organ and thus an agency of New Zealand; finding a corporation owned by TOWFC is
not an agency, because majority ownership by an agency within the FSIA does not
grant agency status).
250. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 51,51 (1992). The author suggests that the only meaningful comparative analy
sis of international law is based not on how a particular entity is treated by other na
tions, but rather how that entity is treated by its own government. See id. Such a
comparison is impossible in this case because there are no comparable tiered state
owned commercial enterprises in the United States. The United States, unlike Euro
pean, socialist, or developing third world countries, does not invest in commercial en
terprises and so its agencies are entirely different from commercial corporations in a
tiered corporate structure. Differences include the fact that United States agencies,
such as the American Red Cross and the United States Olympic Committee are almost
exclusively non-profit, do serve a governmental purpose, and ownership is direct. See
supra note 214 for an explanation of how U.S. courts treat United States owned
corporations.
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in extending foreign sovereign immunity protections to commercial
corporations on the basis of governmental ownership.2s1 Other
countries decide the question of when governmental agencies will
receive immunity on the basis of either the purpose of the agency or
the amount of control a foreign government has over that
agency.2S2 Three codifications of international law, one proposed
by the International Law Commission of the United Nations,2s3 the
United Kingdom's State Immunity Act,2S4 and the Council of Eu
rope's European Convention on State Immunity,2ss all provide im
munity only for governmental agencies that perform a
governmental purpose. 2S6 Nationalized corporations and other
state owned enterprises, even those directly owned by a govern
ment, do not expect special immunity protection anywhere in the
western world, including the very countries where the corporations
were formed, except in United States courts.
It has been suggested that section 1603(b) be amended to re
251. Section 1603(b)(2)'s majority ownership requirement is unique, so that even
without tiering, on the basis of direct government ownership of stock, the FSIA has a
much broader scope of what fits the definition of a protected agency or instrumentality.
See M.P.A. Kindall, Note, Immunity of States for Noncommercial Torts: A Comparative
Analysis of the International Law Commissioner's Draft, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1849, 1860-61
(1987) (stating that the FSIA extends broader immunity than other codifications); see
also Hoffman, supra note 15, at 584.
252. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 551-65 (providing a comparative analysis of
the FSIA's majority ownership provision with England, Switzerland, Germany, France,
and Belgium); Dellapenna, supra note 250, at 54, 57, 59, 60 (providing an overall study
of European sovereign immunity traditions and finding that England bases agency im
munity on the existence of sovereign authority, France bases agency on the existence of
a public nature, and Germany does not extend immunity to governmental agencies at
all); Kindall, supra note 251, at 1849-50, 1861 (suggesting that generally, international
law on foreign sovereign immunity is far from uniform; noting, however, that according
to international standards immunity granted agencies and instrumentalities depends on
purpose or control).
253. Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its Forty- Third Session, U.N.
GAOR Int'! Law Comm., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. AJ46/lO (1991). Like the
Restatements, the International Law Commission's draft is a codification of what the
law should be rather than existing practice. See Kindall, supra note 251, at 1851. It has
not been adopted yet by the United Nations General Assembly. See id. at 1888.
254. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, art. 5, reprinted in 10 HALSB. 757 (4th ed.
reissue 1995).
255. European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, art. 27(2), Europ.
T.S. No. 74, at 4, reprinted in 3 EUROP. CONY. & AGREE. 39 (1972-74).
256. See Kindall, supra note 251, at 1860-62 (comparing four codifications of in
ternational law: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the proposed draft by the
United Nation's International Law Commission, the British State Immunity Act, and
the European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol, ratified by some
but not all European states).
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move the majority ownership requirement altogether. 257 It is ar
gued that by favoring these corporations the law penalizes not only
United States plaintiffs but also our domestic corporations that
must compete with these favored entities. 258 An argument to elimi
nate the majority ownership requirement from the FSIA is beyond
the scope of this Note. 259 The unfair disparities in treatment that
section 1603(b)(2)'s critics point to, however, are even more appar
ent when courts allow tiering. With tiering, the number of potential
United States plaintiffs harmed increases proportionately with the
number of potential foreign corporation defendants. Likewise, with
tiering, preferential treatment given to foreign corporations impacts
domestic corporations in direct proportion to the number of poten
257. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 565-66 (stating that the majority ownership
requirement of section 1603(b)(2) is out of line with international practice). "No other
country in the world has adopted state ownership as a basis for conferring sovereign
legal status on commercial corporations." Id. at 565.
258. See Elizabeth Verville, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 86
DEP'T ST. BULL. 73, 78 (1986) (stating that the State Department was examining
whether truly commercial enterprises such as state-owned airlines should be removed
from the FSIA); see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Hearings on H.R. 1149,
1689, and 1888 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) (testimony of Mark B.
Feldman, Comm. on Foreign Sovereign Immunity (sic) Act, American Bar Association,
Section of Int'l Law and Practice) (declaring his belief that because most lawyers are
unfamiliar with complexities of the FSIA, courts make many mistakes deciding FSIA
cases; asserting that eliminating commercial corporations entirely would serve the pub
lic interest). See generally, Hoffman, supra note 15 (arguing against the inclusion of any
commercial state owned corporations within the FSIA, regardless of whether state own
ership is direct or indirect).
259. This Note argues only against allowing tiering within the FSIA, the extension
of section 1603(b)'s majority ownership requirement to all subsidiary corporations with
ownership that can ultimately be traced to a foreign state. Congress intentionally en
larged the scope of traditional foreign sovereign immunity with section 1603(b). See
Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Furthermore, section
1603(b) creates a bright-line, predictable measure of which corporations qualify for
FSIA protections and avoids case-by-case determinations based on arguments of con
trol. See supra Part 1.C.1 for a discussion of congressional goals in enacting the FSIA.
It is important to remember that once within the FSIA, these entities uniformly fall
within the commercial activity exception of section 1605(a)(2). See 42 U.S.c.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1994). See supra Part 1.C.2 for a procedural explanation of the FSIA.
Thus it is only the procedural benefits and not total immunity, which the FSIA grants
these entities.
However, if the arguments against extending any immunity benefits to commercial
enterprise which are directly owned by a foreign state are compelling, how much more
compelling are the arguments against extending immunity benefits to subsidiary corpo
rations in multi-tiered enterprises with only indirect foreign state ownership. The bright
line disappears as issues of control are argued, and predictability for American plaintiffs
vanishes. See supra Part III.B.2 for an argument that tiering is contrary to congres
sional goals in enacting the FSIA.
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tial foreign corporations. With tiering, the United States' already
generous immunity treatment is further removed from international
practice at a direct cost to private and corporate Americans.
When United States courts allow tiering, then, courts grant for
eign-government-owned corporations immunity protections that
are uniformly denied to them elsewhere, at a cost to United States
plaintiffs and domestic commercial corporations. Congress enacted
the FSIA to bring the United States' foreign sovereign immunity
policy into line with international practice. 260 A requirement of di
rect foreign government ownership for commercial corporations to
qualify for foreign state status allows the United States policy to
better conform to prevailing standards of international law. 261
CONCLUSION

In 1976, Congress was acutely aware of the unfair situation that
faced a United States plaintiff who had a claim against a foreign
state, but had little way of knowing how, when, or if that claim
would be heard in court. 262 "American citizens are increasingly
coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by for
eign states."263 In 1976, Congress found a pressing need to protect
the rights of American citizens against the increasing number of
foreign corporations. This need is especially evident today, when
our world economy, in a way perhaps never contemplated by Con
gress twenty years ago, is dominated by multinational corporations
with "pyramidal, multitiered corporate structures."264
Tiering of indirect ownership interests should not be allowed
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. When courts allow
tiering they extend immunity benefits where Congress never in
260. See supra Part I.Cl; see also 1976 Hearings, supra note 11, at 33 (testimony
of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State) (responding negatively when
asked whether any provisions in the FSIA were significantly different than immunity
treatment in other commercially developed nations). Congress enacted the FSIA to
respond to the unequal treatment United States corporations received in courts abroad,
especially in Europe after World War II. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the
unequal treatment U.S. owned corporations faced abroad that led to the enactment of
the FSIA
261. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 551-65, 565 n.149 (outlining the "separate
entity" rule as it is used in Western European countries today and stating that no other
country has a rule comparable to section 1603(b), nor do any international law organi
zations advocate foreign state status based on ownership).
262. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCAN.
6604,6605.
263. 1d. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCAN. at 6605.
264. BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 8.
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tended, as evidenced most strongly by the FSIA's purpose in pro
tecting government instrumentalities compared to a realistic look at
the types of corporations claiming immunity protection under sec
tion 1603(b). The current circuit split on this issue is a source of
great interest to foreign corporate conglomerates. 265 The average
United States citizen, on the other hand, is unaware that the issue
of tiering even exists. However, the resolution of the issue of
whether the FSIA allows tiering of corporate subsidiaries will have
major consequences for the vast number of United States citizens
who are employed by, are harmed by, or do business with, some
times unknowingly, a corporation with partial and indirect owner
ship ties to a foreign state.
Jane H. Griggs

265. See Michael M. Baylson & Clare Ann Fitzgerald, Courts Disagree on the
Extent to Which the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Permits Pooling of Interests and
Tiering of Subsidiaries by Foreign Governments, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at B7; Darryl
van Duch, When Does a Sovereign State Control a Company?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996,
at B1; John Fellas, Tiering of Ownership Interests Under the FSIA, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8,
1997, at 1.

